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RECREATIONAL RIGHTS AND TITLES TO BEDS
ON WESTERN LAKES AND STREAMS
RALPH W. JOHNSON* AND RUSSELL A. AUSTIN, JR.t
What rights do riparians, their licensees, and the public have to
use the small lakes and streams of the West when the beds are pri-
vately owned? This is the question which this Article attempts to
answer. However, to do this, an analysis had to be made of which
lake and stream beds were privately owned. Thus, the Article covers
both the questions of title to beds and rights of surface use.
The selection of the states West of the Mississippi was partly
arbitrary, to limit the size of the project. Although there are cer-
tain elements of similarity among these Western States (all except
Texas were carved out of the federal domain; they are the most
recently created states; they are for the most part less densely pop-
ulated than those farther East; nearly all of them have placed more
emphasis on recreation as a state asset; and, with few exceptions, all
contain arid regions within their borders), little reason was found
to conclude that these similarities caused the courts to apply different
rules than the Eastern States. Cases are cited from states East of
the Mississippi from time to time where they seemed specially rele-
vant to the material at hand.
The objective has been to determine the relative rights of the
public, riparians, and subjacent owners to the use of the nonnavig-
able natural lakes and streams of the West. The uses in question
include boating, swimming, fishing, viewing, and homesite location.
The relations of these riparians and subjacent owners vis-i-vis each
other have been examined to determine how lake rights are develop-
ing and changing in light of the rapidly increasing pressure of mod-
ern use.
This Article is concerned only incidentally with appropriative
* Professor of Law, University of Washington, Seattle.
t Member of the firm of Rutherford, Kargianis & Austin, Seattle, Washington;
member of the State Bar of Washington.
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rights, and with the relationship of the appropriation and riparian
systems in those states where both systems exist. It has been found
that the differences among the states concerning lake and stream sur-
face law have not particularly correlated with the differences con-
cerning consumptive use law. It cannot be said, for example, that
because a state has the appropriation system, or the riparian system,
or a combination of both, that a certain rule will apply to lake or
stream surface use. The two fields of consumptive use and surface
use, although related, are sufficiently distinct from each other so
that case law has developed independently.1 Thus, there has been
little need to integrate the two fields.
Artificial lakes and streams have not been discussed. They open a
different and difficult field of law that could well be the subject of a
separate writing, and one Which would be too much of a diversion
from the principal burden of this Article.
The concern here is primarily with those bodies of water where
the beds are privately owned. These include waters that are non-
navigable by the federal test of navigability, as well as those that are
nonnavigable under various state tests where those tests cover more
water than the federal test.
It is assumed that there are rapidly growing pressures and con-
flicts concerning the use of the surface of these lakes and streams.
Numerous other writings have dealt with the problem of increasing
use of the waters of the Nation for recreation.2 The fact of this in-
creasing use is accepted as a basic premise. The cases are analyzed
in light of that premise to see how the courts are meeting and solv-
ing the new conflicts.
The initial concern in this Article was with the use of the surface
of these lakes and streams, rather than with the title to their beds.
It was found, however, that the title question persisted in intruding
into the analysis. Many early cases and some later cases held, for
example, that the public had a right of surface use only Where title
1. This is not to say that no such conflicts have been reported. In Washington and
California, for example, consider: In re Clinton Water Dist.; 36 Wash. 2d 284, 218
P.2d 309 (1950) ; City of Elsinore v. Temescal Water Co., 36 Cal. App. 2d 116, 97
P.2d 274 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939) ; City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460,
52 lP.2d 585 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935) ; Litka v. City of Anacortes, 167 Wash. 259, 9 P.2d
88 (1932) ; In re Martha Lake Water Co., 152 Wash. 53, 277 Pac. 382 (1929).
2. Waite, Public Rights To Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 Wis.
L. Rev. 335; Note, 5 U. Fla. L. Rev. 166 (1952) ; Comment, 12 Wyo. L. J. 167 (1958)
Comment, 3 S.D.L. Rev. 109 (1958) ; Maloney & Plager, Florida Lakes: Problems in a
Water Paradise, 13 U. Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1960) ; 22 Hennepin L. Rev. 26 (1953) Com-
ment, 12 Iowa L. Rev. 411 (1927).
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to the bed was held by the state or federal government. Some of
these cases have now been overruled, and the rules changed. Never-
theless, to explain the development of the law of surface use it has
been necessary first to explain the development of the law concern-
ing title to beds. Subsequently, this Article deals with the problems
of surface use among. riparians, bed owners, the state, and the
public.
No writers in the past have tried to survey or analyze either the
title or surface use cases for lakes and streams of the.Western States.
Between 1899 and 1940, water law scholars of the West reflected
the economic and social problems of their era and wrote extensively
about stream law and consumptive rights. The great treatises by
Angell in 1877,' Farnham in 1904,' Wiel in. 1911,' and Kinney in
19128 dealt only briefly with surface use law. Professor Bade, writ-
ing in 1940, was the first to raise some of the issues in the field of
surface use law that are now considered important.7 However, even
Bade was concerned more with the law of Minnesota than the law
of the Western States, and with title questions rather than with sur-
face rights. Since the Second World War, several other writers have
written about surface use law, but for the most part they too have
been concerned with title issues," or with the law of a particular
state.' Professor Waite is one of a very small group who has written
directly on the question of surface use law. In a 1958 article he
urged public management of the use of lake surfaces through im-
position of use fees, the adoption of lake zoning laws, and of boat
traffic regulations.'° Again in a 1961 article he argued the need for
public management and briefly reviewed the federal, state, and local
constitutional and common law bases that might support such man-
agement." Professor Munro also has written on lake- surface law.
In 1961 he reviewed Minnesota lake law, pointing out some of its
inconsistencies and arguing in support of the trend which he noted
3. Angell, The Law of Watercourses (1877).
4. Farnham, The Law of Waters and Water Rights (1904).
5. Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States (1911).
6. Kinney, The Law of Irrigation and Water Rights (1912).
7. Bade, Title, Points and. Lines in Lakes and Streams, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 305
(1940).
8. Note, 1957 Wis. L. Rev. 486; Comment, 3 S.D.L. Rev. 109 (1958); Comment,
21 Tul. L. Rev. 454 (1947) .. ..
9. Note, 5 U. Fla. L. Rev. 166 (1952) ; Maloney & Plager, supra note 2.
N"l. Waite, The Dilemma of Water Recreation and a Suggested Solution, 1958
Wis. L. Rev. 542.
11. Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal Union, 10 Buffalo L. Rev. 427 (1961).
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toward greater public use of the state's lakes.' 2 Lastly, one of the
authors of this Article in 1960 surveyed the lake law of Washington,
analyzing a number of the lake cases in other states to show the
trend of these cases toward greater public use. l"
This Article, however, represents the first time that an effort has
been made to systematically and comprehensively survey the lake
and stream surface use cases of the Western part of the Nation, or
of any large section of the Nation, and to critically compare and
evaluate these cases.
Before turning to a discussion of the law of title to lake and
stream beds, it would be helpful to comment on a few terms, in par-
ticular the terms "navigable," "navigability," and "riparian rights."
These terms are thoroughly woven into the fabric of water law, yet
are more than usually chameleon in character, changing from time to
time, from place to place, and from writer to writer. The terms
"navigable" and "navigability," as applied in water law, are used as
concepts to decide a host of legal relationships covering titles, rights
of use, powers to legislate, and the like. Some of the relevant uses
of the terms are:
(1 ) The English test of navigability to determine title to beds. 14
(2) The federal test of navigability for determining title to
beds.' 5
(3) The various federal tests of navigability in statutes passed
under the commerce clause of the federal constitution.' 6
(4) The various state tests of navigability for determining title
to beds."
(5) The various state tests to determine the extent of the public
right of use of the surface for recreation where the bed is privately
owned.'"
12. Munro, Public v. Private: The Status of Lakes, 10 Buffalo L. Rev. 459 (1961).
13. Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 Wash. L. Rev.
580 (1960).
14. E.g., The Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874).
15. E.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
16. E.g., United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Ditch Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899)
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
. 17. E.g., Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937) ; Ortel v. Stone,
119 Wash. 500, 205 Pac. 1055 (1922) ; Roberts v. Taylor, 74 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622
(1921) ; Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 90 Ore. 13, 175 Pac. 437 (1918) ; Welder v.
State, 196 S.W. 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) ; Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 Pac.
685 (1905) ; Johnson v. Hurst, 10 Idaho 308, 77 Pac. 784 (1904) ; Lamprey v. Metcalf,
52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
18. E.g., Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954) ; Bohn v. Albertson,
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(6) The various state tests to determine the extent of the right
of other riparians to use the surface for recreation where the bed is
privately owned.'
(7) The various state tests to determine the extent of the public
right to float logs on waters where the bed is privately owned.2
(8) The various state tests set forth in statutes for different
purposes.2'
In many of the above examples the terms "navigable" and
"navigability" are defined differently. To say the least, caution is
required in the use of these concepts to avoid confusion.
The term "riparian rights" also poses problems of definition.2
In a physical sense the word riparian describes the relationship of
land to water, that is, riparian land is land that is adjacent to water.
The significance of the term "riparian," however, is in its impact
on "riparian rights." Here is where the greater difficulty lies. It has
been found that the differences between states in the rules applied
and even in the same state where different litigants are involved,
that is, riparian versus riparian, riparian versus public, riparian
versus state, riparian versus appropriator, and when different issues
are raised, that is, the right to fish, to swim, to wade, to appropri-
ate water, to build structures in a lake or stream, to have access to
the water, to stop or cause accretions, and to view the water, are so
great that generalizations can only be made with great care. The
meaning of the term depends on the economic, social, and legal his-
tory of the state, on the nature of the litigants, and on the nature of
the issues.
Two aspects of the term may be generalized. The first concerns
the kind of interest in land that a person must have in order to en-
joy such rights. By definition "riparian land" means land that is
adjacent to water. The term describes a physical relationship, and it
is this physical relationship that gives rise to the special bundle of
107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951) ; Guilliams v. Beaver Lake
Club, 90 Ore. 13, 175 Pac. 437 (1918).
19. E.g., Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960); Snively v.
Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1915 (1956).
20. E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561, 95 Pac. 499 (1908) ; Monroe Mill Co.
v. Menzel, 35 Wash. 487, 77 Pac. 813 (1904).
21. E.g., Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, aff'd,
55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
22. It should be noted that while the term "littoral rights" was formerly used
frequently to distinguish lake rights from river (riparian) rights, it is only of slight
historic significance and will not be used again in this Article.
JANUARY 1967]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
rights called riparian rights.23 As the physical relationship of the
land and water is the nexus of the matter, it follows that one who
controls the physical use of the land, that is, the possessor, is the
one who normally holds its riparian rights. Thus, riparian rights
would accrue to lessees and life tenants, and to adverse possessors;
whether they would accrue to holders of easements would seem to
depend on the scope and purpose of the easement, that is, was it in-
tended to be broad enough to carry riparian status with it.24
Further, riparian rights are a result of the possession of riparian
land; that is land adjacent to water, not land underlying water.25
In most cases the possessor of the riparian land also owns the bed
under the water adjacent to his upland. However, if these parcels
are in separate ownership, it would seem doubtful that the bed
owner would acquire any "riparian" rights, such as the right to use
the surface, or to allow his licensees to use the surface, in common
23. See Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533 (1938);
Wholy v. Caldwell, 108 Cal. 95, 41 Pac. 31 (1895) ; Indianapolis Water Co. v.
American Strawboard Co., 53 Fed. 970 (C.C.D. Ind. 1893).
24. The authors have been intrigued by the question whether an easement holder,
either private individual or government body, can be a riparian in the traditional
sense. If so, and if the holder is a governmental body, what benefits might accrue to
the public by virtue of the easement? In essence, the courts that have considered
these questions have quite uniformly found that the easement owner's rights are to be
determined from the intent of the grantor, which will in turn be inferred from the
purpose of the easement. Two types of easements most clearly constitute the holder a
riparian, no doubt to the exclusion of his grantor. The first is the broad easement
giving to the grantee such exclusive control of the property that the courts feel
riparian rights must accrue to them. E.g., Hanford v. St.. Paul & D.R.R., 43 Minn. 104,
42 N.W. 596 (1889) ; In re Otter Tail Power Co., 128 Minn. 415, 151 N.W. 198 (1915).
The second is where the easement is granted for the purpose of allowing the grantee
access to the water. E.g., State v. Yates, 104 Me. 360, 71 At. 1018 (1908) ; Hathaway
v. City of Milwaukee, 132 Wis. 249, 111 N.W. 570 (1907).
The more difficult question, however, concerns not so much the rights of the
individual easement riparian, but the rights that might accrue to the general public
by virtue of an easement held by a governmental body as, for example, one arising
out of a street dedication condemnation. The number of people that might be given
access to a lake via such an easement is potentially very large. See particulary
the recent case of Flynn v. Beisel, 257 Minn. 531, 102 N.W.2d. 284 (1960),
which explicitly stated that other than fee owners may possess riparian lake rights
(without reference to the licensee rationale) through common law dedication of an
easement to the lake and public acceptance thereof by use.
An interesting aside is found in the 1961 New York case of Thornhill v. Skidmore,
32 Misc. 2d 320, 227 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Sup. Ct. 1961), where the court found an implied
easement over the defendant's property to allow other community residents a right of
use in a nonnavigable canal.
25. E.g., Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard Co., 53 Fed. 970, 974
(C.C.D. Ind. 1893), where the court said: "The ownership of the bed of the river is
not the foundation of 'riparian rights' properly so called, because the word 'riparian'
is relative to the bank, and not to the bed of the stream . .. .
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with other riparians. Nor would it seem that he would have any
remedies as a riparian to bar others from the use of the surface over
his property.
For ease of presentation, this Article has been divided into two
principal parts; (1) title to beds, and (2) right of surface use.
There is also an appendix which attempts to collect all the leading
lake and stream surface cases in the subject states, the design and
categories of which are explained therein.
While summaries are usually reserved for the conclusion of a
writing, it is believed that certain propositions advanced in this
Article warrant some brief initial mention to prepare the reader
for the discussions that will follow. Thus, several propositions are
set forth to indicate the subject matter and scope of the Article.
I
SUMMARY OF PROPOSITIONS
A. On Title to Beds
All the state courts that spoke on the subject prior to 1926 as-
sumed that the test of navigability for deciding title to the beds of
lakes and streams was their own state test. Some of these tests of
navigability were significantly different than the federal test.
The United States Supreme Court decided three cases between
1922 and 1931 that made clear that the federal test of navigability
must be applied to determine which lake and stream beds passed to
the several states upon statehood.2 From this trilogy, 1926 has
been adopted as the dividing line in time among the Western cases.
Most later state court cases have either explicitly recognized the
controlling effect of the federal test, or have coincidentally adopted
or affirmed state tests consistent therewith.
B. On Right of Use
On navigable lakes and streams where the bed is state-owned, the
courts are agreed that the public has a right of use.
Prior to 1926 the courts tended to lump together the question
of title to beds and the right of public use. If the bed were state-
owned, the public had such a right of use; if the bed were privately
owned, the public had no such right.
The Brewer-Holt-Utah series of cases held that the federal test
controlled navigability for title. The federal test turned on com-
26. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank,
270 U.S. 49 (1926) ; Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
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mercial usefulness, not on pleasure boat use. This required consider-
able re-thinking in a number of state courts on the question of the
public's right of use.
Nine states West of the Mississippi now recognize a right of the
public, or at least others than the owner of the bed, to use the sur-
face of lakes and streams where the beds are privately owned.
Two of these states, Washington and Minnesota, recognize a right
in the other riparians and their licensees to use these waters. Texas
can only be included in this list on the basis of particularly weak
dicta, but in its place, or as a tenth state, Iowa might be added. This
state is unique in that its supreme court has held that the beds of
non-navigable lakes and streams are still owned by the federal gov-
ernment, and that the waters overlying these beds are available to
the public for general use.
Six other states West of the Mississippi have spoken against a
public right of use of waters where the beds are privately owned.2 s
For the most part, however, these cases were decided earlier than
those noted in the last paragraph. Further, one of the six applied
an erroneous "pleasure boat" test for determining title which ren-
ders virtually all its river and lake beds state-owned.2 9
Of all the aforementioned sixteen states, only the State of Wash-
ington has squarely met the problem of non-owner abuse of this
right of common surface use, although Minnesota and Wyoming
have also spoken on the issue. All three of these states have applied
a test of "reasonableness" to determine the legal limits of the com-
mon right of use.
II
TITLE TO BEDS
A. Federal Cases on Navigability for Title
In order to understand the impact of the federal navigability
cases on the law of lake and stream surface use it is necessary to
answer two questions: (1) which test, state or federal, determines
whether a given lake or stream is navigable for title, and (2) if the
federal test controls, what is that test?
Prior to the 1920's the state courts adhered to the view that the
27. California, Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, Washing-
ton, and Wyoming.
28. Arkansas, Colorado, Montana, South Dakota, Utah, and (again) Texas.
29. Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937).
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test to be applied in determining navigability for title was the state
test as announced by each state supreme court.8 0 No United States
Supreme Court case had squarely faced the issue,8' until Brewer-
Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 2 United States v. Holt
State Bank,3 3 and United States v. Utah34 and it was only with these
cases that the United States Supreme Court finally settled that the
question of navigability for title was a federal question, to be de-
cided by the federal test as pronounced by the federal courts."'
These three cases form an important line of demarcation among
the state cases. To facilitate discussion, these three cases will be
30. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890) ; Johnson
v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561, 95 Pac. 499 (1908) ; Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 53
N.W. 1139 (1893) ; Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921) ; Guilliams v.
Beaver Lake Club, 90 Ore. 13, 175 Pac. 437 (1918) ; Welder v. State, 196 S.W. 868,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1917) ; Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239 (1900).
31. The Supreme Court came close to answering the question in Wear v. Kansas,
245 U.S. 154 (1917), where it considered a Kansas Supreme Court decision in which
that state court had taken judicial notice of the navigability (for title) of the Kansas
River. The petitioner claimed that if navigability in fact were the issue as the state
court had held, then petitioner was entitled to a trial by jury on that question, and
the state court was in error in taking judicial notice of such navigability. Answering
this contention, the United States Supreme Court said that this raised "a question of
state law." It should be noted, however, that the United States Supreme Court did not
say that the test of navigability to be applied was a question of state law, but only
that the state court's taking judicial notice (as opposed to a jury determination) of
navigability was a state law question.
The federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the question
of title navigability in the widely cited case of Harrison v. Fite, 148 Fed. 781 (8th
Cir. 1906), but took an ambiguous position, referring merely to the "test of navigability
as understood in the American law . . . ." Id. at 783. Apparently the court assumed
that there was only one test. No mention was made of the possible need to distinguish
between a federal test and the various state tests.
32. 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
33. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
34. 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
35. This is not to say that such questions, now that they are labeled "federal ques-
tions," can automatically be taken to the federal courts for determination, either by
removal or otherwise. The manner in which federal questions can be gotten into the
federal courts is complex, has been covered by a substantial body of legal literature,
and is outside the scope of this Article.
Illustrative of some of the problems is the case of Economy Light, 256 U.S. 113,
where the Supreme Court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court had earlier held the
river in question to be nonnavigable and a writ of error had been dismissed by the
United States Supreme Court on the ground that "no federal question was involved."
The Court (in Economy Light) went on to say that this dismissal did not bind the
United States to that ruling of nonnavigability and held the river navigable.
It is said that "there is a federal question lurking in the background of almost
every controversy." London, Federal Question Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion,
57 Mich. L. Rev. 835, 839 (1959). It is also true that a great many cases that involve
federal matters will be litigated in the state courts.
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referred to as the "Brewer-Holt-Utah" series, or to the date 1926,
when the important Holt case was decided.
1. What is the Federal Test?
What is the federal test for title? This is not an easy question to
answer. Only a handful of cases have been decided by the Supreme
Court on the issue, and these have left many questions unanswered.
Part of the problem is the lack of any clearly charted verbal defini-
tion of navigability. Needless to say, even with such a precisely
drawn verbal formula there would be difficulty in predicting the re-
sults of its application to the unique geographical features of real-
life lakes and streams. However, there is no such precisely drawn
word formula. This lack is attributable, in part, to the failure of
the United States Supreme Court to separate the cases dealing with
title navigability from those dealing with navigability for other pur-
poses. Of the 14 cases that make up the principal Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the question of navigability, 6 6 are concerned with
title questions.8 7 However, none of these has attempted to describe
how title navigability differs from navigability for other purposes.
The only case that has made such an attempt was the well known
commerce clause case of United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co.38
The first 2 3 of these 14 cases, both decided in the 1870's, were
concerned with the imposition of penalties against vessels for op-
erating on "navigable waters of the United States" without licenses
or contrary to regulations as set forth in the federal statutes passed
under the authority of the commerce clause. In both cases the
Supreme Court held the waters navigable, and developed the test
that has been cited and relied on for deciding virtually all navigabil-
ity issues since that date. In these two cases the court rejected the
36. Upon careful examination of the cases dealing with navigability one finds
that the Supreme Court relies on only a relatively small number of cases for the defini-
tion of navigability. These are: United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311
U.S. 377 (1941) ; United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935) ; United States v. Utah,
283 U.S. 64 (1931) ; United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-
Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922) ; Oklahoma v. Texas, 258
U.S. 661 (1891) ; Economy Light Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921); United
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) ; Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621 (1900);
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Ditch Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899) ; St. Anthony
Falls Water Power Co. v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349 (1897) ; Packer v.
Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891) ; United States v. The Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874) ; The
Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. 557 (1870).
37. Oregon, Utah, Holt State Bank, Bresver-Elliott, Oklahoma q. Texas, Packer V.
Bird, supra note 36.
38. 311 U.S. 377 (1941).
39. The Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874) ; The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870).
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English test of navigability, which was based on the ebb and flow of
the tides, and said:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they
are used or are susceptible of being used in their ordinary condition,
as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.
40
The other 12 cases have been concerned with (1) riparian
rights under the state law of Minnesota,4' (2) title to beds of lakes
and streams, 42 (3) compensability of property rights allegedly taken
under the navigation servitude,43 (4) applicability of an act of
189044 making it unlawful to create or maintain any wharf, pier,
dam, or other obstruction "in any navigable waters of the United
States" unless approved and authorized by the Secretary of War,45
(5) applicability of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 189946 pro-
hibiting the creation of any obstruction "to the navigable capacity
of any of the waters of the United States" unless authorized by the
Secretary of War, 47 and (6) applicability of the Federal Power
Act of 192048 prohibiting construction of dams on "those parts of
streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdic-
tion under . . ." the commerce clause.
4 9
The indiscriminate citing of this group of cases can be illustrated
as follows: in Packer v. Bird,50 the earliest title navigability case in
40. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870).
41. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S.
349 (1897).
42. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935) ; United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64
(1931) ; United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926) ; Brewer-Elliott Oil &
Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922) ; Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922)
Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
43. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1916).
44. 26 Stat. 454- (1890), 33 U.S.C. § 606 (1964).
45. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621 (1900) ; United States v. Rio Grande Dam
& Irr. Ditch Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
46. 30 Stat. 1151 (1899), 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964).
47. Economy Light Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
48. 41 Star. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 796 (1964).
49. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1941). The Court
in this case considered navigability under the Rivers and Harbors Act, and the Federal
Power Act to be the same. This has been explicitly so stated in Rochester Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'r, 344 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1965).
50. 137 U.S. 661, 666 (1891): "those rivers are regarded as public navigable rivers
in law which are navigable in fact, as said in the case of The Daniel Ball . ..
'they are navigable in fact where they are usable, or are susceptible of being used,
in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.' "
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which the navigability issue was discussed, the Court relied without
comment on The Daniel Ball; in United States v. Cress5 (naviga-
tion servitude case) the Court relied on The Daniel Ball, The
Montello, Rio Grande (Act of 1890, under the commerce clause),
and Leovy (Act of 1890, under the commerce clause) ; in Brewer-
Elliott, 2 Holt,"5 Utah,54 and Oregon,55 the Court at different places
relied on all the above cited cases in addition to Economy Light
(Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899) and St. Anthony Falls (riparian
rights in Minnesota).
It was not until the 1940 decision of United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co.5" that the Court finally attempted to sort out the
prior decisions and indicate that navigability for title might be de-
fined differently than navigability for other purposes. In Appala-
chian the Court held that the Federal Power Act 5 7 gave the Federal
51. 243 U.S. 316, 324 (1916): "That the test of navigability in fact should be ap-
plied to streams in their natural condition was in effect held in The Daniel Ball . .. ."
Id. at 323. The Court then cited and quoted The Montello holding that, "If it be
capable in its natural state of being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what
mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law
a public river or highway." (Emphasis the Court's.) The Court also cited without
comment Packer v. Bird, Leovy v. United States, and United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irr. Ditch Co. for judicial recognition of "the limitation of the public right to
the natural state of the stream . . . ." Id. at 325.
52. 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922):
A navigable river in this country is one which is used in its ordinary condition,
as a highway for commerce over which trade and travel is or may be conduc-
ted in the customary modes of trade, and travel on water. It does not depend
upon the mode by which commerce is conducted upon it . . . but upon the fact
whether the river in its natural state is such that it affords a channel for use-
ful commerce.
The Court cited Economy Light, The Montello, and The Daniel Ball as authority.
53. 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926) : Navigability in fact depends "on the fact, if it be a
fact, that the stream in its natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for use-
ful commerce." The Court cites The Montello, Cress, Economy Light, Oklahoma, and
Brewer-Elliott.
54. 283 U.S. 64, 83 (1931): Quoting the definition from United States q. Holt State
Bank, the Court cited The Daniel Ball, The Montello, and Holt. The Court also quoted
from The Montello for the rule that "the capability of use by the public for purposes
of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a
river, rather than the extent and manner of that use." The Court cites Packer and
Economy Light as additional authority.
55. 295 U.S., 14 (1935) : The Court held that navigability is "to be determined
according to the law and usages recognized and applied in the federal courts, even
though . . . the waters are not capable of use for navigation in interstate or foreign
commerce." The Court cites Holt, United States v. Utah, and Brewer-Elliott. The
Court further cites, without comment, the following cases as authority for the rule to
be applied to determine navigability (for title in this case): Oklahohoma V. Texas,
Economy Light, Rio Grande, and The Daniel Ball.
56. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
57. 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 796 (1964).
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Power Commission jurisdiction over New River in Virginia and
West Virginia despite the fact that the river was not navigable in
its natural state and could only be made so with artificial improve-
ment. On this artificial improvement issue the title cases were ex-
pressly distinguished, the Court noting that:
Although navigability to fix ownership of the river bed or riparian
rights is determined . . . as of the formation of the Union in the
original states or the admission to statehood of those formed later,
navigability, for the purpose of the regulation of commerce, may
later arise. An analogy is found in admiralty jurisdiction, which may
be extended over places formerly nonnavigable.',
Appalachian is thus a clear warning that the cases need sorting
according to the purpose for which navigation is being determined.
2. Commerce Clause Navigability
The power of Congress to legislate concerning interstate and
foreign commerce is very broad and is not dependent upon the
navigability or nonnavigability of waters over which the commerce
might pass but rather is contingent only upon the requirement that
such waters, or travel on them, have an "effect" upon interstate
commerce.5 The transport of goods over the intrastate Lake
Chelan, in Washington, separated by a 600 foot drop to the inter-
state Columbia River, could be subjected to federal control because
the goods are then transferred to other carriers that travel in inter-
state commerce via land or air.6° Also, the trickle of water in the
tiny step-across "Jack" creek in central Washington could be sub-
58. 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940).
59. In United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Ditch Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899),
the Court said: "We may . . . properly limit our inquiry to the effect of the proposed
dam and apppropriation of waters upon the navigability of the Rio Grande .... .
in deciding whether a dam on a nonnavigable upstream portion of the river would
interfere with the federally protected commerce on the downstream navigable portion
of the river. Id. at 701. More recently in Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508
(1941), in approving federal authority to dam an Oklahoma river not navigable in
Oklahoma but navigable outside that state, the Court held that the dam would have
a "tangible" effect on the navigable portion of the river and was therefore subject to
commerce clause federal power. Note, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 761 (1941) ; Note, 90 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 102 (1941).
60. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co. v. Northern Okla. Rys., 25 F.2d 689 (8th Cir.
1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 610 (1928) (a ten-mile railroad line entirely within one
county in Oklahoma was subject to ICC control even though locally owned and operat-
ed because coal will pass over the line on its way to other states) ; Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (a restaurant serving primarily local people is subject
to federal regulation because it buys meat from a local dealer who buys it interstate
and the cumulative effect at many such operations has an impact on commerce sufficient
to require regulation of the unit in order to direct the effect of the mass).
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jected to federal control because these waters then flow into the
Teanaway River, then the Yakima, and finally into the navigable
Columbia River.6 If enough such trickles were interfered with,
the navigability of the Columbia might be affected; thus, Congress
has power to control the development and use of such waters.
It is still possible, of course, for the courts to be faced with
"navigability" questions under particular statutes enacted under
the commerce clause, but these questions are essentially ones of
statutory construction-that is, whether Congress intended to legis-
late only concerning navigable water (as defined in the statute) 62
and not whether Congress could, under the Constitution, legislate
with regard to anything wet. It would, of course, be possible for
such statutes to define the terms "navigable" and "navigability" in
the same way they are defined in the title cases, but this would be
strictly coincidental. One would need to look carefully at the word-
ing and purpose of the statute as well as at its legislative history to
make certain that such a meaning was intended.
There is, of course, one type of commerce clause navigability
that is not a creature of statute-navigation servitude navigability-
and it would appear at first that the cases on this subject might
provide useful insights on the navigability test. This is not so,
however, for several reasons: (1) the test of navigability for the
application of the navigation servitude is probably that set out in
Appalachian,63 (2) none of the navigation servitude cases has given
any considered attention to the navigability test, and (3) only
one navigation servitude case 64 has ever been cited in the title
navigability cases, and that citation was largely perfunctory. For
certain of the navigation servitude issues, navigability of the waters
is immaterial. 65
One might rationalize the early mixture of commerce clause and
title navigability cases on the ground that the court had not then
developed its commerce clause jurisprudence as it now has. Neither
the need for, nor the reality of, federal control over everything
61. Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
62. E.g., Johnson v. Wurthman, 227 F. Supp. 135 (D. Ore. 1964).
63. See the discussion of this question in Morreale, Federal Power in Western
Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 Natural Re-
sources J. 1, 4-6 (1963).
64. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
65. As Morealle points out, when Congress "expressly exercises its power over a
nonnavigable tributary in order to 'protect' the navigable capacity of the mainstream"
such exercise "eliminates, in effect, all distinction between 'navigable' and 'non-
navigable' . . . ." Morealle, supra note 63, at 74-75.
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affecting interstate commerce was then realized. Now, however, this
jurisprudence has grown to full bloom; it has its own rationale and
its own unique characteristics. It is time, therefore, to separate these
cases from those concerned with title. Appalachian recognizes this,
but only in one brief paragraph. No other Supreme Court case has
been decided on title navigability since Appalachian, and no com-
merce clause case has again discussed the issue. The lower federal
courts offer little help; decisions on both title and commerce clause
questions are disconcerting in their continued indiscriminate citation
of the several lines of navigability cases.0 6 There are no clear lines
of demarcation to serve as guides in future litigation.
3. Navigability for Title
Seven United States Supreme Court decisions have explicitly dis-
cussed the question of navigability for title. 7 Six of these were title
navigability cases, 68 the seventh was Appalachian. In several other
cases the Court has taken judicial notice of the navigability (for
title) of certain waters,6" but did not discuss the test applied in that
determination. Except for the first title navigability case, Packer v.
Bird (1891), all of these cases were decided in the fourteen-year
period from 1921 to 1935; Appalachian then followed in 1940.
66. In Johnson v. Wurthman, 227 F. Supp. 135 (D. Ore. 1964), a commerce clause
case, the court cited and relied upon The Daniel Ball, The Montello, Holt, Utah, and
Appalachian. In United States v. 531.10 Acres, 243 F. Supp. 981 (D.S.C. 1965), a
navigation servitude case, the court cited and relied upon Utah, Holt, The Daniel
Ball, The Montello, and Appalachian. In United States v. Utah, 304 F.2d 23 (10th
Cir. 1962), a title case, the court cited and relied upon The Daniel Ball, The Montello,
Rio Grande, Cress, Economy Light, Oklahoma v. Texas, Brewer-Elliott, Holt, Utah,
Oregon, and Appalachian. In Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 123 F.2d
155 (D.C. Cir. 1941), a commerce clause case, the court cited and relied on The
Daniel Ball, The Montello, Economy Light, Oklahoma v. Texas, Holt, Appalachian,
Oregon, Utah, Brewer-Elliott, and Cress. In Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. FPC, 147
F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1945), a commerce clause case, the court cited and relied upon
The Daniel Ball, Economy Light, Appalachian, Oklahoma v. Texas, Brewer-Elliott,
Rio Grande, and Leovy v. United States.
67. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) ; United
States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931);
United States v. Holt State Bank, 240 U.S. 49 (1925) ; Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co.
v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1921);
Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891). In Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), the
Court was concerned with title to the bed of a navigable river, but assumed without
discussion that the river in question was navigable for title.
68. Oregon, Utah, Holt, Brewer-Elliott, Oklahoma v. Texas, and Packer, supra
note 67.
69. For example, see the title navigability case of Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1(1894), and the commerce clause navigability cases of United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irr. Ditch Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899), and Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423
(1931).
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4. Navigability Determined as of the Date State Joins Union
In accordance with the constitutional principle of equality of
states, the title to the beds of rivers within each state pases to that
state when it is admitted to the Union, if the rivers were then
navigable.7 0 As this date is different for virtually each state, the
test must necessarily be applied on such different dates.
This aspect of navigability for title would appear to be differ-
entiated from navigability under the commerce clause cases. In
Appalachian the Court expressly noted this difference, pointing out
that "for the purpose of the regulation of commerce, [navigability]
may later arise. ' 71
It is immaterial that the river is not now used for commerce, or
that it has not been used for many years. Navigability is deter-
mined by whether it was commercially usable at the time the state
came into the Union.7 2
Needless to say, one of the more bothersome aspects of this rule
is the increasing difficulty, with the passage of time, of establishing
either the physical characteristics, or the transportation uses of a
given river or lake at the time the state joined the Union. Cali-
fornia, for example, joined the Union in 1850. No one is alive today
who can tell us from personal observation what the river was used
for in 1850, or what it was physically like at that time. Other
methods of proof can be used, it is true, but the overall persuasive-
70. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931) ; United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1941). But note that a different position was
taken in the early Circuit Court of Appeals case of Harrison v. Fite, 148 Fed. 781
(8th Cir. 1906), where the court mistakenly said:
It does not follow that, because a stream or body of water was once navig-
able, it has since continued and remains so. Changes may occur, especially in
small and unimportant waters, from natural causes, such at the gradual attri-
tion of the banks and the filling up of the bed with deposits of soil, the
abandonment of use followed by the encroachment of vegetation, and the
selection by the water of other and more natural and convenient channels of
escape, that work a destruction of capacity and utility as a means of trans-
portation; and, then this result may fairly be said to be permanent, a stream
or lake in such condition should cease to be classed among those waters that
are charged with a public use.
Harrison was a title case, and the court was deciding that title to the bed of the
water in question was in the riparian because it was nonnavigable. Therefore, the
public had no right of use of the waters.
71. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1941).
72. This follows from the rule that navigability at the time of statehood is the
criterion. Furthermore, it is not actual use that is in question, but only susceptibility for
use. Thus, it is immaterial that the water is not now being used, and has not been used
for many years for commercial purposes. Contra, the early case of Harrison v. Fite, 148
Fed. 781 (8th Cir. 1906), in which the court, prior to and without the aid of the
Bre'wer-Holt-Utah series, said that navigability for title could be lost through disuse.
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ness of the evidence will continue to diminish with the passage of
time.
5. Natural and Ordinary Condition
One is tempted to say, on the basis of Holt, Utah, and Appala-
chian that navigability for title depends upon the usability of water-
ways for commerce in their "natural and ordinary condition," not on
their potential usefulness after artificial improvements have been
made. A careful reading of the title navigability cases tends to sup-
port this rationale; for example, in Holt and Utah the Court reiter-
ated the earlier test of The Montello that waters are navigable
"when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their nat-
''73ural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce ....
The difficulty comes from Appalachian,'7 the case that purported to
start the sorting-out process between cases concerned with navigabil-
ity for title and those concerned with navigation for other purposes.
The following quotation contains the critical language:
To appraise the evidence of navigability on the natural condition only
of the waterway is erroneous. Its availability for navigation must also
be considered. 'Natural or ordinary conditions' refers to volume of
water, the gradients and the regularity of the flow. A waterway,
otherwise suitable for navigation, is not barred from that classification
merely because artificial aids must make the highway suitable for
use before commercial navigation may be undertaken. Congress has
recognized this in section 3 of the Water Power Act by defining
'navigable waters' as those 'which either in their natural or improved
condition' are used or suitable for use. . . .Nor is it necessary that
the improvements should be actually completed or even authorized.
The power of Congress over commerce is not to be hampered because
of the necessity for reasonable improvements to make an interstate
waterway available for traffic.
Of course there are difficulties in applying these views. Improvements
that may be entirely reasonable in a thickly populated, highly de-
veloped industrial region may have been entirely too costly for the
same region in the days of the pioneers. The changes in engineering
practices or the coming of new industries with varying classes of
freight may affect the type of the improvement. Although navigabil-
ity to fix ownership of the river bed or riparian rights is determined
73. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931) ; United States v. Holt State
Bank, 240 U.S. 49, 56 (1925).
74. A number of case notes commented on the uncertainties inherent in the navig-
ability discussion in Appalachian: 50 Yale L.J. 134 (1941) ; 54 Harv. L. Rev. 876
(1941) ; 35 Ill. L. Rev. 346 (1941) ; 25 Minn. L. Rev. 636 (1941).
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• . . as of the formation of the Union in the original states or the
admission to statehood of those formed later, navigability, for the
purpose of the regulation of commerce, may later arise. An analogy
is found in admiralty jurisdiction, which may be extended over places
formerly nonnavigable. There has never been doubt that the navi-
gability referred to in the cases was navigability despite the obstruc-
tion of falls, rapids, sand bars, carries, or shifting currents.7 5
Far from providing one with a clearly charted path, this lan-
guage appears to be subject to three possible interpretations:
(1) For title navigability the waters must be usable in their
natural state, without the need of improvements or artificial aids,
whereas for commerce clause navigability the waters will be held
navigable if they can be made navigable with reasonable improve-
ments. This would seem to follow from the fact that title naviga-
bility is determined as of the date the state entered the Union,
whereas "navigability, for the purpose of the regulation of com-
merce, may later arise."
(2) For either title navigability or commerce clause navigability
the waters will be considered navigable when they can be made so
with reasonable improvements. This could be argued from the
Court's discussion of "natural and ordinary." One would think that
if title navigability depended upon usability of waters in their nat-
ural and ordinary condition rather than in an "improved" condition,
the Court would have said so, and would have used this means of
distinguishing the title and commerce clause cases. But it confused
the issue by saying that " 'natural or ordinary conditions' " [Here
the court cited a title case 1] " refers to volume of water, the gradi-
ents and the regularity of the flow. A waterway, otherwise suitable
for navigation, is not barred from that classification merely because
artificial aids must make the highway suitable for use before com-
mercial navigation may be undertaken." And again, later, the Court
says that navigability is not lost merely because of the obstruction of
"falls, rapids, and sand bars, carries or shifting currents" and again
cites a title case, 77 this time mixed together with commerce clause
cases.
78
75. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-08 (194-0).
76. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
77. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
78. Economy Light Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921) ; United States v.
The Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874).
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(3) For title navigability the waters must be navigable in their
natural state at the time the state joined the Union, except as to
those improvements that would have been "reasonable" at that
time, considering the then existing (or to be expected?) population
density, transportation patterns, and engineering knowledge. This
might follow from the Court's statement that "Improvements that
may be entirely reasonable in a thickly populated, highly developed,
industrial region may have been entirely too costly for the same
region in the days of the pioneers. The changes in engineering prac-
tices or the coming of new industries with varying classes of freight
may affect the type of the improvement."
The first of these three possible interpretations seems preferable
because the tenor of the whole quotation tends to support it slightly
more than interpretation (2) or (3) and it has the quality of pro-
viding greater predictability and certainty for this important area
of title law. Unfortunately, however, the language of Appalachian
is too ambiguous to resolve the question and further word from the
Court must be awaited to know which interpretation is "the law."
The preference for number (1) is given some further support,
albeit slight, from the fact that there is no case where the court
has found title navigability where the waters in question were non-
navigable in the natural state but could be made navigable by arti-
ficial improvements. The nearest case to this was Utah79 where the
Court held navigable certain sections of the San Juan, Green, and
Grand Rivers despite the presence of numerous obstacles such as
rapids, riffles, and rocks which made navigation difficult at times
and even impossible on occasion. However, the Court emphasized
that the waters could be navigated part of the time and were thus
usable in their natural state. Neither here, nor in any other title
case, has the Court purported to apply the rule of Appalachian that
all those waters will be deemed navigable that have sufficient
"volume, gradients, and regularity of flow" so that they can be
made usable by artificial improvements. Whether the upper reaches
of the Green, Grand, and San Juan Rivers, would have been held
navigable under this test is not known because the United States
did not attempt to quiet title to them and the Court did not there-
fore report on or consider the physical characteristics of these por-
tions of the rivers. From evidence available from other sources one
79. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
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could argue that these waters are navigable under the Appalachian
test.8 0
6. Interstate Navigability Not Required
One aspect of the title navigability test is clear-the waters need
not be navigable in interstate commerce; intrastate navigability is
sufficient. In United States v. Utah the Court said that it was "un-
disputed" that certain of the waters in question were navigable only
within the State of Utah, yet held them navigable for title.8 '
Certain of the commerce clause cases must be distinguished here.
In The Daniel Ball, for example, the Court was construing a statute
covering "navigable waters of the United States ' 8 2 and said this
phrase included only water which "form[ed] . . . by itself, or by
its connection with other waters, a continued highway over which
commerce . . . may be carried on with other States or foreign
countries . ... ",83
7. Highways for Commerce Via the Customary Modes of
Trade or Travel on Water
Another element of the test of navigability not yet clearly de-
fined is the one that requires the waters to be usable as highways
for commerce by the "customary modes of trade and travel on
water. ' 8 4 The extreme position would be to say that if the waters
are sufficient to float logs, fur traders' canoes, or fishermen's boats,
they are navigable. This would not leave many lakes or streams in
the nonnavigable category. Again, however, Supreme Court deci-
sions leave much to speculation.
Log floating is one of the uses of a river or lake that can be ac-
complished with less water, and in more turbulent water, than many
other commercial activities; however, none of the title navigability
cases has yet faced or even discussed the log floating question. Three
commerce clause cases, The Montello, Rio Grande, and Appala-
chian, all touch on the question, although their comments are too
80. The Green River in Utah, above where it was held navigable in United
States v. Utah, is reported to be a most popular fishing stream, with gentle grades
down which many sportsmen float in canoes, boats, and rubber life rafts throughout
most of the year. Sufficient water is available in the river that in Wyoming, upriver
from Utah, the Bureau of Reclamation has built Fontenelle Reservoir, creating a
lake of about 7,500 acres, and in Utah has built Flaming Gorge Reservoir creating
a reservoir of about 43,000 acres.
81. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931) ; see also United States v.
Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
82. Act of July 7, 1838, 5 Stat. 304; Act of August 30, 1852, 10 Stat. 61.
83. United States v. The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 439 (1874).
84. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926).
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brief to be much help. In The Montello, the Court seemed to sug-
gest that if there were enough water to float log rafts, then the
waters were "navigable." 85 A few years later in Rio Grande the
Court qualified this earlier statement by saying that "the mere fact
that logs, poles and rafts floated down stream occasionally and in
times of high water does not make a navigable river. '"86 In Appala-
chian the Court again touched on the question, saying, "[T]he uses
to which the streams may be put vary from the carriage of ocean
liners to the floating out of logs . . . .The tests of navigability
must take these variations into consideration. 81 7 Needless to say,
these brief statements do not provide definitive answers.
Rowboating and canoeing are two other activities that can occur
on very small lakes and streams and are sometimes today considered
"commercial" because of the presence of resorts and fishing guides.
More importantly, in the early days these methods of transportation
formed important means of communication and carriage through-
out much of the West. Recognizing this fact the Supreme Court in
Holt held Mud Lake and Mud River in Minnesota navigable for
title, describing them as follows:
In its natural and ordinary condition the lake was from three to six
feet deep. When meandered in 1892 and when first known by some
of the witnesses it was an open body of clear water. Mud river
traversed it in such a way that it might well be characterized as an
enlarged section of that stream. Early visitors and settlers in that
vicinity used the river and lake as a route of travel, employing the
small boats of the period for the purpose. The country about had
been part of the bed of the glacial Lake Agassiz and was still swampy,
so that waterways were the only dependable routes for trade and
travel. Mud river after passing through the lake connected at Thief
river with a navigable route extending westward to the Red river of
the North and thence northward into the British possessions. Mer-
chants in the settlements at Liner and Grygla, which were several
miles up Mud river from the lake, used the river and lake in send-
ing for and bringing in their supplies. True, the navigation was
limited, but this was because trade and travel in that vicinity were
limited. In seasons of great drought there was difficulty in getting
boats up the river and through the lake; but this was exceptional,
the usual conditions being as just stated . . . . Some years after
the lake was meandered, vegetation such as grows in water got a
85. United States v. The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 441 (1874).
86. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Ditch Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899).
87. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 405 (1941).
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footing in the lake, and gradually came to impede the movement of
boats at the end of each growing season, but offered little inter-
ference at other times. 8s
This probably describes about the minimal physical condition for
water that can be called navigable. 9 It will be noted, however, that
these waters were used for transportation and travel during early
times, and in fact at one period constituted the principal means of
conveyance from certain settlements. This does not, therefore, sug-
gest that merely because waters are of sufficient depth, breadth, and
length to float canoes or small boats they will be deemed navigable
for title.
United States v. Oregon9" demonstrates this last point. There the
Court in an action to quiet title brought by the United States against
the State of Oregon held Malheur, Harney, and Mud Lakes in
southeastern Oregon nonnavigable for title. Of the three lakes,
Malheur came closest to being navigable. The lake might aptly be
described as a low spot with a bit of water in it in the middle of a
huge mud flat. In 1931, when the special master inspected the lake,
he found about 400 acres covered by water of "negligible depth,"
surrounded by about 1,000 acres of mud. During an average year
some 39,678 acres would be under water, 11,715 under one foot or
less, 10,126 under one to two feet, 6,988 under two to three feet,
10,821 under three to four feet, and 26 acres under four to five feet.
During an occasional, exceptionally wet year, the water would be
somewhat deeper. In the average year extensive mud flats around
the lake made difficult the launching of boats which had to be
dragged many yards through these areas to reach water. Evidence
of past boating did not show any commercial use. Local witnesses
had rarely if ever seen boats on the lake. Although the evidence
showed that a few rowboats and canoes had been used by trappers
or duck hunters, they usually had a draft of only one to six inches,
and had to be dragged over the mud to the water. The lake con-
tained tules and other water vegetation, impenetrable at many
88. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1926).
89. A brief attempt was made in the early commerce clause case, The Montello,
to describe the minimal limits of navigability, where the Court said:
It is not, however, as Chief Justice Shaw said (Rowe v. Bridge Co., 21 Pick.
344), 'Every small creek in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be
made to float at high water, which is deemed navigable; but, in order to
give it-the character of a navigable stream, it must be generally and commonly
useful to some purpose of trade or agriculture.'
United States v. The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 442 (1874).
90. 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
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points, through which was a labyrinth of channels leading to no
definite destination. Only four motorboats had ever been seen on
the lake, and these had been used only to a limited extent. The
Court concluded, "These conditions preclude the use for navigation
of the area in question, in its natural and ordinary condition, accord-
ing to the customary modes of trade and travel over water, and
establish an absence of that capacity for general and common use-
fulness for purposes of trade and commerce which is essential to
navigability." 9
Comparing nonnavigable Malheur Lake with navigable Mud
Lake of Holt we can see that Malheur Lake was deep enough, wide
and long enough to be navigable, but was distinguished in that (1)
it was geographically isolated from habitation and from transpor-
tation routes, (2) was surrounded by extensive mud flats making
access difficult, and (3) and had never been used for commercial
travel.
Presumably from these two cases one can conclude that mere
depth, length, and breadth of water are not sufficient for title
navigability. They must also be so geographically located and so
physically accessible as to be actually usable in going from place to
place.
This raises the question of the navigability of the thousands of
small lakes in the West that range from five to 400 or more acres
in area and are as much as eighty feet or more in depth. Many of
them are used extensively by recreationists for boating, swimming,
fishing, and hunting, although not for commercial travel. Certainly
they are deep enough and large enough for floating commercial
vessels; and they are not surrounded by extensive mud flats such as
Malheur Lake. Many of them are touched by highways, or have ac-
cess roads to them. The two factors that distinguish them from navi-
gable Mud Lake in Holt are (1) they are not geographically lo-
cated so that they can be conveniently used to go anywhere, and (2)
no commercial travel has ever taken place on them. Needless to say,
the second of these two elements seems to be the least important,
(except to the extent that it tends to prove the first) because the
Court has said many times it is concerned with "susceptibility" of
use for commerce, not actual use.
The problem is illustrated by Silver Lake in the State of Wash-
ington, which along with numerous other similar small lakes in that
91. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 23 (1935).
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state,92 the Washington Supreme Court has held nonnavigable. 3
This lake has about 485 acres of surface area, 94 is three and one-half
miles long by one-third mile wide, and up to eighty feet deep. A
roadway crosses one end of it. The lake has never been used for
commercial travel and because of its geographical location shows no
likelihood of being so used in the future. Would it be navigable for
title under the federal test? The United States Supreme Court deci-
sions do not provide any clear and certain answers. These lakes are
probably not navigable-under the authority of Oregon. It is true
that they do not have the mud flat inaccessibility problem that
existed in Oregon; nonetheless they are similarly isolated from large
centers of population and from transportation routes, that is, they
do not go anywhere, and no commercial travel has ever occurred on
them. The Supreme Court, in Oregon as well as in other title navi-
gability cases, has emphasized the need for commercial usability.
Certainly in the extreme case of an alpine lake of fifty acres, lo-
cated at 10,000 feet on a mountainside, accessible only through a
tortuous mountain road, and leading nowhere but to the other side
of the lake, it would seem that the Court would consider it non-
navigable for title. If this is correct, the question becomes one of
deciding how much geographical isolation is required before a
floatable body of water will be considered nonnavigable. As with
so many other aspects of the title navigability question, a further
pronouncement by the Supreme Court is needed.
8. Summary of Title Navigability Test
The above Supreme Court decisions on title navigability can
be summarized: navigability for title should be considered sep-
arately from navigability for commerce clause or other purposes.
There are four criteria for navigability for title:
( 1 ) Navigability for title is determined as of the date each state
came into the Union.
(2) Such navigability is determined by the natural and ordinary
condition of the water at that time, not whether it could be made
navigable by artificial improvements. However, the fact that rapids,
92. See, e.g., Snively v. State, 167 Wash. 385, 9 P.2d 773 (1932) ; Best v. State,
153 Wash. 168, 279 Pac. 388 (1929) ; Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114
(1925).
93. Levevre v. State, 195 Wash. 537, 81 P.2d 819 (1938).
94. Washington Department of Conservation, Division of Water Resources, 2
Lakes of Washington 462 (1964).
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rocks, or other obstructions make navigation difficult will not destroy
title navigability so long as the waters were usable for a significant
portion of the time.
(3) Navigability in intrastate commerce is all that is required,
not usability in interstate commerce.
(4) The waters must be usable by the "customary modes of
trade or travel on water." This may include waters usable for com-
mercial log floating. This includes waters as little as three or four
feet deep that are geographically located so they have been, or can
be used by canoes and rowboats for commercial trade and travel
(fur traders' canoes). This does not include waters which are dif-
ficult to access because of surrounding mud flats or the like, and
which are geographically isolated from habitation and transporta-
tion routes, and which have never been and are not likely to be used
for commercial trade or travel. This probably does not include
waters that are geographically isolated from habitation and trans-
portation routes and which have never been and are not likely to be
used for commercial trade or travel, even though these waters are
deep enough and large enough to float commercial type vessels, and
are not physically inaccessible because of mud flats or the like.
B. The State Cases on Title to Beds
After the above examination of the federal cases on title navi-
gability, an examination of the state cases now follows to determine
whether they agree that the federal test is controlling, and if not,
whether their pronounced tests are significantly different than the
federal test.
1. Pre-1926 State Cases
a. Local Law Deemed Controlling
It is not surprising that the state cases prior to the Brewer-Holt-
Utah series reflected the view that the test of navigability was for
the states to decide as a local matter. No United States Supreme
Court case had squarely raised the issue of the controlling effect of
the federal test, and the state courts could hardly be expected to
raise the issue on their own initiative. Their natural tendency was
to keep jurisdiction over all such matters until the federal courts
made it clear that the question was controlled by federal, not state,
law.
JANUARY 1967]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
State supreme courts in Arkansas, 5 Idaho, " Minnesota,97 North
Dakota,"" Oregon,99 Texas, 00 and Washington' 01 announced that
"local law" governed the question of navigability for title. They
universally rejected the "ebb and flow" test of the English common
law, examined the various common law decisions on navigability in
the United States, and then selected their own "state" tests. No
state cases have been found which recognized the controlling effect
of the federal test prior to 1926.
b. Significantly Out of Phase With Federal Law
Of the decisions noted above which announced, or assumed, that
local law controlled the test of navigability, those in Iowa, Minne-
sota, North Dakota, Oregon, and Washington were especially sig-
95. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890).
96. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561, 95 Pac. 499, 507 (1908) :
It is common knowledge that most of the streams of this state rise in the
mountains, and are used more generally for floating timber than for carrying
passengers or freight. This being so, we deem it advisable to recognize as
navigable streams used either for . . . floating lumber, logs, wood, or any
other product to the market. . . . We believe, therefore, the conditions pre-
vailing in this state fully justify this court in holding many streams to be
navigable which under the decisions of other states would be nonnavigable,
and that this court is fully warranted in applying the principle of riparian
ownership, as applied in many states to nonnavigable rivers to what we term
'navigable' rivers.
97. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (1893): "In this state,
we have adopted the common law on the subject of waters, with certain modifications
. . . the principal of which are that navigability in fact, and not the ebb and flow of
the tide, is the test of navigability . .. .
98. Roberts v. Taylor, 74 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622, 625 (1921):
It is essential to first determine whether the waters of the lake involved
are to be deemed public or private waters. This is for determination by this
state in accordance with its policy and law. ...
It may not be doubted that in this state such test is a test of navigability
in fact borrowed from both civil law and common-law principles in contra-
distinction to the so termed 'tidal test of the common law.'
99. Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 90 Ore. 13, 175 Pac. 437 (1918). This case
does not expressly reject the ebb and flow of the tide test, but adds to it other cate-
gories.
100. Welder v. State, 196 S.W. 868, 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917): "But, as the
entire internal commerce in this country, prior to the building of railroads, was
carried on our large rivers and great lakes, the tide water test was found not
applicable to our conditions, and another test was applied, viz. navigability in fact."
101. Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239, 240-41 (1900) :
[A]lthough at the common law the test of the navigability is the ebb and flow
of the tide, yet, especially in this country, it is held that the rivers and streams
above the ebb and flow of the tide, which have sufficient capacity for useful
navigation, are public rivers, and subject to the same general rights which the
public possesses in navigable waters.
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nificant because they adopted tests substantially different from the
federal test, and thus were most clearly in error. These cases fall
into two categories:
(1) Those which held that the beds of navigable waters belonged
to the state, but which applied the "pleasure boat" test or some other
test of navigability substantially out of phase with the federal test
(Minnesota, North Dakota, Washington, and, once again, Ore-
gon) ;
(2) The cases of Iowa which held that the beds of nonnavigable
lakes belonged to the federal government, but were subject to state
control.
Still a third group of cases might be singled out as having been
decided, if not in error, at least under a misapprehension as to the
implications of the federal test of navigability. In Colorado,10 2
Idaho, °3 and Oregon0 4 the courts held that the beds of some, if
not all navigable rivers belonged to the riparians. 10 5 Although such
decisions were admittedly within the power of the state courts to
make under the rule that state courts can determine the construction
of federal grants to riparian lands, 0 6 they were, in fact, made under
a misapprehension as to where title was at the time. Apparently
these courts thought title still remained in the federal government,
not realizing that it had passed to the states upon their statehood.
Two of these courts, Idaho and Oregon, have since modified their
holdings and now say that title to beds of navigable waters (under
tests consistent with the federal test) are in the state.0 7 No sub-
sequent Colorado decisions on the subject have been found.
The Oregon decisions require further comment. In the Guilliams
case the Oregon court adopted a unique, four-part classification
102. Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 Pac. 685 (1905).
103. Johnson v. Hurst, 10 Idaho 308, 77 Pac. 784 (1904).
104. Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 90 Ore. 13, 175 Pac. 437 (1918).
105. In Montana (Gibson v. Kelley, 15 Mont. 417, 39 Pac. 519 (1895)), and
South Dakota (Flisrand v. Madson, 35 S.D. 457, 152 N.W. 796 (1915)), the courts
hold that a riparian on navigable waters owns to low watermark. But since the
bed of all navigable waters up to high water mark went to the states upon their
joining the Union, one may well wonder why the courts have decided to construe
away this strip of land between low and high water mark. As in the case of Colo-
rado, Idaho, and Oregon, the answer would appear to lie in a lack of understanding
by these courts of the true state of the title at the time of their decision. It should be
observed, however, that a court might knowingly so hold if it wanted to give a high
priority to the riparian's right of access.
106. Harden v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508 (1902).
107. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Hirzel, 29 Idaho 438, 161 Pac. 854 (1961) ; Luscher v.
Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936).
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of state waters which, among other things, held that the beds of
fresh water streams "which are navigable in fact for boats, vessels
or lighters," were privately owned. Under the federal test these
waters were clearly navigable for title, and title thus passed to the
state upon its admission to the Union. It is true that the state
supreme court has the power to transfer such lands to the riparians
by its final decision,' s but there is nothing in the opinion to indi-
cate that it knowingly intended this result, and subsequent deci-
sions suggest that such was not its intention.'0 9
In Minnesota'" and North Dakota"' the courts took a different
approach, holding that the state owned the beds of all navigable
waters, but then defining navigability, under their assumed local
option to do so, to include waters too shallow to be useful for any-
thing other than pleasure craft, such as hunting and fishing skiffs.
This test included waters nonnavigable under the federal test, and
is hereafter referred to in this Article as the "pleasure boat" test.
Washington similarly adopted an early test of navigability which
was apparently inconsistent with the federal test. The court started
correctly in 1905 by adopting a test not unlike the federal test and
holding navigable a lake which had for a number of years carried
commercial sight-seeing vessels." 2 Again in 1917 the court seemed
to apply a rule consistent with the federal cases in rejecting the
"pleasure boat" test of Minnesota."' But in 1922 the court de-
cided two lake cases where it appeared to take an approach contrary
to the federal cases. (It should be remembered that the impact of
the Brewer-Holt-Utah series was not felt until some time after
1922). In these two cases the Washington court held navigable two
108. Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508 (1902).
109. E.g., Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936).
110. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (1893): "Certainly, we
do not see why boating or sailing for pleasure should not be considered navigation, as
well as boating for mere pecuniary profit." A subsequent federal case construed the
Minnesota law as holding that the title (jus Privatum) to the beds of navigable waters
was in the riparians. Hobart v. Hall, 174 Fed. 433 (C.C.D. Minn. 1909), aff'd, 186
Fed. 426 (8th Cir. 1911). A few years later the Minnesota Supreme Court seemed to
hold that title to these beds was owned by no one. State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 148
N.W. 617 (1914). For a discussion of these cases, see Bade, Title, Points and Lines in
Lakes and Streams, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 305 (1940).
111. Roberts v. Taylor, 74 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622, 626 (1921): "A use public in
its character may exist when the waters may be used for the convenience and enjoy-
ment of the public, whether traveling upon trade purposes or pleasure purposes."
112. Madson v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 40 Wash. 414, 82 Pac. 718
(1905), apeal dismissed, 212 U.S. 565 (1909).
113. Neterer v. State, 98 Wash. 635, 168 Pac. 170 (1917), rejecting the rule es-
poused in Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
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small lakes, of 40 and 200 acres, ranging from 15 to 50 feet in
depth. They were large enough and deep enough to float commercial
vessels, but were geographically so located that commercial use was
and would continue to be impractical. Nonetheless, the court deemed
them "susceptible" of commercial navigation and thus navigable for
title purposes.
The Iowa court in an 1899 decision initially assumed that "the
title to all lake beds in the state" belonged to the state without
regard to navigability. 14 Then, ten years later, the court changed
its position about the beds of nonnavigable lakes, holding that if
the lake were meandered, the title remained in the federal govern-
ment. 115
c. Applying Federal Test or One Consistent Therewith
The Idaho Supreme Court saw the error of its ways by 1916
and changed its rule, holding in the Callahan".6 and Hirze1 7 cases
that the beds of navigable waters belonged to the state. The Idaho
court also, in the Hirzel case, adopted a broad test of navigability
consistent with the federal test."'
The Nebraska court adopted a rule of navigability in 1895 that
was consistent with the federal test, although without indicating
whether it realized the binding effect of that test." 9 In the same
114. Rood v. Wallace, 109 Iowa 5, 79 N.W. 449 (1899), appeal dismissed, 187 U.S.
87 (1902).
115. State v. Jones, 143 Iowa 398, 122 N.W. 241 (1909), aff'd sub nom. Marshall
Dental Mfg. Co. v. Iowa, 226 U.S. 460 (1913).
116. Callahan v. Price, 26 Idaho 745, 146 Pac. 732 (1915).
117. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Hirzel, 29 Idaho 438, 161 Pac. 854 (1916).
118. The test stated in Hirzel is broad enough (rivers are navigable in law which
are navigable in fact) to be consistent with the federal test. However, some question
about the meaning of the phrase is left open in Idaho because it was also used in the
1908 case of Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561, 95 Pac. 499 (1908), where the general
statement was simplified in such a way as to make clear that a "pleasure boat" test
was intended. What the present Idaho court would do with this issue is therefore open
to some question.
119. Clark v. Cambridge & Arapahoe Irr. & Improvement Co., 45 Neb. 798, 64
N.W. 239, 240-41 (1895):
But the doctrine of the common law has not, as a rule, been accepted in this
country, and has been entirely repudiated by the courts of the United States,
in determining the jurisdiction of Congress over lakes and streams, whether
situated in two or more states, or within the boundaries of a single state. In
those courts, navigability in law is synonomous with navigability in fact,
without regard to the influence of the ocean tide, and includes those waters
only which afford a channel for useful commerce . . . . The courts of this
state will take notice of this fact, which is also established by abundant
proof,-that the Republican is not a navigable river, within the foregoing de-
finition.
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year Montana adopted a broad test of navigability consistent with
the federal case, saying it approved the rule that "is now established
by the overwhelming weight of American authority that a stream
navigable in fact is navigable in law. ' 120
In 1925 the Washington court changed its test of navigability to
conform to the federal test, though again without explicit recog-
nition of its controlling effect. 12'
The courts in Arizona, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming did
not speak on the issue of navigability for title, or on the controlling
effect of the federal test, prior to 1926.
2. Post-1926 State Cases
The Brewer-Holt-Utah line of cases' 22 had a substantial impact
on the later state decisions although surprisingly few of those state
cases explicitly recognized the need for a choice between the state
and federal tests of navigability. In view of the virtually unanimous
opinion of the state courts prior to 1926 that the state test con-
trolled, one might think that following 1926 many decisions would
be found noting the error of these earlier cases, but this is not true.
The Minnesota and North Dakota courts are the only courts
that expressly recognized the need to choose between the federal
and state tests of navigability for title. Both courts accepted the
federal test. The Minnesota court first addressed itself to the
question in the decision of State v. Adams23 where it said:
Based upon decisions cited, the conclusion is inescapable that what
Minnesota owned in its soverign capacity as a state upon admission to
the Union and what was retained by the United States as a part of
the public domain clearly involves a Federal question. Whatever we
120. Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417, 39 Pac. 517, 519 (1895).
121. Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114, 116 (1925):
Navigability is always a question of fact. Whether a body of water is navig-
able in the true sense of the word depends, among other things, upon its size,
depth, location, and connection with, or proximity to, other navigable waters.
It is not navigable simply because it is floatable for logs or other timber pro-
ducts or because there is sufficient depth of water to float a boat of com-
mercial size. A lake which is chiefly valuable for fishing or for pleasure
boats of small size is ordinarily not navigable. In order to be navigable, it
must be capable of being used to a reasonable extent in the carrying on of
commerce in the usual manner by water.
The court then goes on to quote the test stated in Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574
(1922).
122. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
123. 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661 (1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826 (1958).
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may have assumed the law to be prior to United States v. Holt State
Bank, . . . it is clear that since that decision the waters over which
Minnesota may assert ownership as an incident of statehood due to
their navigability must be determined under Federal law.1 24
The North Dakota court similarly adopted the federal test of
navigability after discussing the federal cases which declared its
supremacy. 125 Interestingly, this court failed to call attention to its
own earlier decision applying an erroneous pleasure boat test.12
The courts in four other states, Louisiana,' 27 Oklahoma, 28 Ore-
gon,' 2' and Washington' 30 all indicated that they were "conforming"
to the federal rule, without explicitly noting that they were required
to do so, or that their previous decisions were incorrect by that rule.
Other post-1926 courts in Missouri, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming
appear even less aware of the controlling effect of the federal test,
although they apply tests apparently consistent with it.''
In the arid Southwest the courts of Arizona, Nevada, and New
Mexico have not, as yet, discussed a test of navigability for title.
Only one state since 1926 has expressly applied a test different
than the federal test. In 1937 the South Dakota court stated:
In the early history of the common law the rights of the public in
navigable waters were confined to navigation. But the term navigable
124. 89 N.W.2d at 686.
125. Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N.D. 464, 37 N.W.2d 488, 491 (1949): "On
these facts, measured by the federal rule as to navigability it is certain that the lake
was not navigable in fact at the time of the admission of the state into the union.
126. Roberts v. Taylor, 74 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921).
127. State v. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833, 836 (1927):
The rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States is that
streams and lakes which are navigable in fact are deemed navigable in
law . . . . The same rule with regard to navigable waters of the state, as
contradistinguished from the navigable waters of the United States, has been
observed in the decisions of this court.
128. Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. State, 200 Okla. 134, 191 P.2d 224 (1948).
129. Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158, 1161 (1936):
Clearly, under the federal test for the determination of the navigability of
streams, this small inland lake, which is only one mile long and one-eighth
mile wide, cannot be regarded as a navigable body of water in the sense that
the title to the bed of the lake would pass to the state by virtue of its ad-
mission to the Union.
130. Smith v. State, 184 Wash. 58, 50 P.2d 32, 33 (1935) : "We are satisfied in this
respect with the holding in Snively v. State, . . . which approves, and is bottomed on,
the en banc decision in Proctor v. Sim, . . . and which may be spoken of as the federal
rule. We are not disposed to change or discredit that rule."
1 131. Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17, 22 (1954) : "The rule adopted
in this state to determine whether or not title to the bed of a river is vested in the
riparian owners is the rule adopted in the Federal Courts."
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has been extended and includes waters that are not navigable in the
ordinary sense.' 3 2
The court then applied what was essentially a "pleasure boat" test,
giving as its reason the "natural availability of waters for public
purposes taking into consideration the natural character and sur-
roundings of a lake or stream."' 33 The court relied on the policy
rationale that the beds should be kept public so that the public
would have a right of use for recreational purposes. There is no
mention of the United States Supreme Court decisions which hold
that the test for title is determined by federal law.
In summary, prior to 1926 the state courts, without exception,
believed that they were to determine the test of navigability for
title under their own state laws. Some 6f them adopted tests of
navigability consistent with the federal test, but only by coincidence.
Others adopted tests substantially different, not all of which have
been changed by subsequent state court decisions.
A number of discrepancies exist between the post-1926 cases and
the federal test set out in this Article.
South Dakota stands out as most conspicuously in error, as a
result of the 1937 decision in Hillebrand v. Knapp.3 4 There the
plaintiff riparian sought to enjoin the defendant from growing and
cutting hay on part of a dry lake bed in front of the plaintiff's prop-
erty, on the ground that the lake was nonnavigable and the plaintiff
therefore owned both the bed and the hay. The court held for the
defendant, ruling that the lake bed was owned by the state rather
than the plaintiff. The lake was normally dry about one-half of each
year; during the other one-half of each year it contained only two
or three feet of water, although for several years preceding the
lawsuit, because of a long dry spell, it had contained no water at
all. At no time had it ever been used for commerce, nor was it so
situated as to be susceptible of such use. Nonetheless, the South
Dakota court held the lake navigable for title, basing its decision
on the Lamprey v. Metcalf'3 5 principle that the bed had to be state
owned for the public to have the right of use of the surface. The
court assumed it had jurisdiction to design its own test of navig-
ability for title and thus applied what was essentially a "pleasure
boat" test to find the lake navigable.3 6
132. Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (1937).
133. Ibid.
134. 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937).
135. 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
136. Hillebrand v. Knapp; 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937).
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A Wyoming decision as late as 1961 also perpetuates an error
of some of the earlier state cases in ruling that navigability for
title is determined by state law.3 7 The court did not discuss the
possibility that a federal test might control, and may simply have
overlooked this issue. Furthermore, the test adopted appears broad
enough to be consistent with the federal test and thus, unless the
court applies it in some way inconsistent with the federal cases, the
question is probably academic.
In Idaho and Texas the cases leave some doubt whether the
courts in those states recognize the controlling effect of the federal
test. Similarly in the 1936 Oregon case of Luscher v. Reynolds,""
although the court indicated at one point that navigability for title
was to be determined "within the meaning of the federal cases,"
the opinion reiterated a series of rules regarding ownership of
stream beds from an earlier decision which were clearly at odds
with the federal rule.
Lastly, Iowa poses a unique situation. The court there said in
an early case" 9 that the title to all beds, whether the waters were
navigable or not, was in the state. Clearly, as to the beds of non-
navigable waters, this statement was in error because no grants of
them to the state had ever been made. By 1909 the court saw the
error of its earlier ruling and changed its position, recognizing that
the state did not own the beds, and held that the federal govern-
ment had never disposed of these submerged lands and thus still
owned them. 4
If the state court applies a test of navigability inconsistent with
the federal test, can it later change its mind? To put the question
another way, who is bound by the decision? Res judicata would
clearly bind the parties to the original suit. It would seem, how-
ever, that no positive rule of law would bind anyone else, although
one could anticipate that a court might be reluctant to change such
a rule (especially for the same body of water) if the change would
upset numerous titles.
III
RIGHT OF USE
The cases on the public right of use of waters where the beds
137. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
138. 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936).
139. Rood v. Wallace, 109 Iowa 5, 79 N.W. 449 (1899), appeal dismissed, 187 U.S.
87 (1902).
140. State v. Jones, 143 Iowa 398, 122 N.W. 241 (1909), aff'd sub nom. Marshall
Dental Mfg. Co. v. Iowa, 226 U.S. 460 (1913).
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are privately owned show a remarkable diversity of rule as well as
theory. There are probably few areas of law in which similar prob-
lems have arisen in the several states where the courts have split
so widely, or based their decisions on such diverse theories. Fur-
thermore, there is often little, if any reference by the courts of one
state to the decisions on similar issues in other states.
There appears to be almost complete uniformity regarding the
right of public use on waters where the state owns the beds. In all
the states surveyed, except Colorado,' 4 ' the courts have held that
the public has a right to use these waters for fishing, commercial
travel, recreation, and otherwise. 42 The concern here will be only
with the public right of use where the beds are privately owned.
Thus, the smaller lakes and streams of the West are of primary
concern.
This leads to the preliminary question of when a body of water is
too small to be considered a lake, that is, when it is so small that it is
no longer subject to the special body of rules called lake law, riparian
rights, and the like. No cases have been found which directly hold
that a particular body of water is so small that it is not a "lake."
The question will, however, become increasingly important as more
people seek bodies of water, both large and small, for recreation
and homesites. The Minnesota court has given what seems to be a
reasonable definition of the problem and a suggested criterion. In
a 1960 case the court said:
It does not follow that the foregoing riparian-rights rule applies to
every pothole or swamp frequented by wild fowl and over which a
small boat might be poled to retrieve game, but which as a practical
matter does not lend itself in any substantial degree to the customary
propulsion of boats by outboard motors or cars. A minor body of
water which by its nature and character reasonably has no overall
utility common to two or more abutting owners would fall outside
the rule. No hard-and-fast line can be drawn and each case must be
determined according to its own peculiar facts.143
Probably the more difficult questions lie in a slightly different
direction. If a body of water is large enough to be a lake, are all
parts of it subject to the same set of rules about riparian rights,
public rights, and the like? What about a very shallow portion of
141. Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 Pac. 685 (1905).
142. Of course the qualification should be added that the public must be able to
reach the water without trespass.
143. Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W. 2d 689, 697 (1960).
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a lake, perhaps only a few inches deep, which has been developed
by riparians and those who own the bed as a duck hunting preserve?
Can the riparians and the public use such an area with impunity?
Can a riparian build a fence across such a shallow portion? 14 Can
a riparian fill in part of the lake where the bed is owned by him?
Must he obtain the consent of all other riparians prior to doing so?
Can he do so even with that consent where the public is held to
share the right of use? Only a few of these issues have been raised
by the courts. More definitive answers must await new decisions.
Another perplexing area concerns artificially created lakes or
streams. If the lake or stream is entirely artificial, it is probably
owned or controlled by the owner of the subjacent land and is not
subject to the common law rules discussed here. This may not be
true, however, where the body of water is gradually accepted as
part of the landscape, where lots are sold to riparians for homes,
and where the public becomes accustomed to its use.' 45 The problem
is complicated even more where a lake is created by damming a
stream, or by artificially raising the water table. 4 " Few cases have
been decided on such questions. There does not seem to be an easy
answer in principle. Cases will have to be considered one at a time,
giving regard to the multitude of factors that bear on the issue of a
common right of use. 147
Lastly, it should be noted that some courts say riparian rights
accrue to those who own the upland that borders on the water, and
not to the owner of the bed. Only a few cases have raised this
issue, 48 one reason being that in most instances the upland and the
bed are owned by the same person. Therefore, although some
problems may arise in the future because of such split ownership,
this Article will treat the ownerships in one person as the normal
situation.
144. He can in Texas under the circumstances of Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett,
88 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), where the court allowed the plaintiff ripar-
ian to literally fence the defendant riparian off the major portion of the lake surface,
saying that the riparian bed owner "has right to control that part of the surface of the
lake above his land, including the right to fish in or boat upon the water . . . ." This
result is clearly contrary to the cases following Snively 
€'. Jaber.
145. Cf. Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (Dist. Ct. App.
1951).
146. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 86 S.W.2d 441 (1935).
147. For a good introduction to this subject, see Evans, Riparian Rights in Artificial
Lakes and Streams, 16 Mo. L. Rev. 93 (1951).
148. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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J. Pre-1926 State Cases
The cases prior to 1926 tended to lump together both the issues
of title to bed and right of public use. The courts were prone to say
that if the state owned the bed of the water, that is, if it were navig-
able for title, then the public had a right of use; and conversely, if
the beds were privately owned, the public had no such right of use.
The notion of treating separately these two issues of title and right
of use had not occurred, evidently, to either courts or counsel.
Probably the most widely cited case in this area of the law is the
1893 Minnesota decision in Lamprey v. Metcalf.14 There the
Court adopted the "pleasure boat" test of navigability for title,
giving as its reason:
The importance of the question, both to the public and to riparian
owners, is apparent, when we consider that there are many thousand
of such lakes in this state, which, although most of them may not be
adapted for navigation, in its ordinary, commercial sense, have been,
from earliest settlement of the state, resorted to and used by the
people as places of public resort, for purposes of boating, fishing,
fowling, cutting ice, etc., and the further fact that observation teaches
that the waters of many of these lakes are, from natural causes, slowly
and imperceptibly receding, so that a part of what was then bed,
when surveyed, has, or in time will, become dry land. The right of
the public to use these lakes for the purposes referred to, as well as
the right of the riparian owner to these relicted lands and . . . their
right of access to the water, . . . is the question here. 150
Thus, the Minnesota court took the position that in order to
give the public the right of use of lakes or streams, the title to the
bed had to be in the state. The Arkansas court took the same posi-
tion in 1890,151 as did Texas in 1917,152 and North Dakota in
1921.'53
The Supreme Court of Washington initially started in the same
direction, holding in Griffith v. Holman,'5  that the riparian bed-
owner on a small stream had a right to fence off and keep a fisher-
man out of the portion of a stream flowing across his land. This
149. 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
150. 53 N.W. at 1140.
151. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890).
152. Welder v. State, 196 S.W. 868, 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917): "Behind all de-
finitions of navigable waters lies the idea of public utility. Waters, which in their
natural state are useful to the public for a considerable portion of the year are navig-
able."
153. Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921).
154. 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239 (1900).
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position was modified, however, a short time later when the court
held that the public had an easement to float logs on such nonnavig-
able streams.15 The rule was further limited in a 1956 case recog-
nizing a common right of use among riparians and their licensees on
the surface of nonnavigable lakes. 5 Still, however, the court did
not overrule the Griffith rule concerning recreational use of streams.
Idaho early recognized the need to split the two issues of title
and right of use, holding in a 1908 case that the public had an ease-
ment to use any and all streams of the state for log floating, even
though the beds were privately owned.' 5' It should be noted, how-
ever, that this decision was based on the erroneous assumption that
the beds of all lakes and streams, whether navigable or not, were
privately owned. In later cases the Idaho court recognized that the
beds of navigable waters belonged to the state, in which case there
is no question of the public right of use. 58
B. Post-1926 State Cases
Even some decisions after the 1926 series still tied the two issues
of title and right of use together, for example, the decisions in
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah. In South Dakota the
court in 1937 adopted the "pleasure boat" test for title, holding
the same criteria applicable to the public right of use. 59 In Utah
the court in 1946 adopted a "federal" type of test for title while
holding the same criteria applied to public right of use. 6 ' In 1921
the North Dakota court adopted the "pleasure boat" test for title,
at the same time tying the public right of use to the test, 6 ' but
later, in 1949, changed its title test to conform to the federal rule
without mentioning that this might affect the criteria for determin-
ing the public right of use. 62
155. Watkins v. Dorris, 24 Wash. 636, 64 Pac. 840 (1901).
156. Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
157. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561, 95 Pac. 499 (1908).
158. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Hirzel, 29 Idaho 438, 161 Pac. 854 (1916) ; Callahan v.
Price, 26 Idaho 745, 146 Pac. 732 (1915).
159. In the early history of the common law the rights of the public in navi-
gable waters were confined to navigation. But the term 'navigable' has been
extended and includes waters that are not navigable in the ordinary sense.
[W]hether or not waters are navigable depends upon the natural availability
of waters for public purposes taking into consideration the natural character
and surroundings of a lake or stream.
Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (1937).
160. Monroe v. State, 111 Utah 1, 175 P.2d 759 (1946).
161. Roberts v. Taylor, 74 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921).
162. Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N.D. 464, 37 N.W.2d 488 (1949).
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In spite of the decisions in these three jurisdictions applying the
same criteria to title and public right of use, the clear trend of
cases since 1926 has been toward treating the issues separately.
The trend has also been toward recognizing a public right of use
even where the title to the bed is privately owned.
Nine states West of the Mississippi now recognize the right of
public or non-owner use of waters where the bed is privately owned:
California, 1 3 Idaho,'1 4 Minnesota," 5 Missouri, 60 New Mexico, 67
Oregon,"" Washington,'0 9 Wyoming, 70 and Texas, 71 although the
last state can only be included on especially weak dicta. The de-
cisions in all of these jurisdictions came after the Brewer-Holt-Utah
series, although not necessarily as a direct result thereof. In each
case, however, the decision which first separated the two issues
was either one of first impression, or was one where, because of
the announced paramountcy of the federal test of navigability for
title, the court had to reevaluate its position. The decisions, there-
fore, represent much direct thought on the question.
The Minnesota and Oregon courts had to revise their positions
as a result of the Brewer-Holt-Utah series. As noted earlier, Min-
nesota was the jurisdiction that originated the "pleasure boat" test
for determining title to the beds of waters. 172 It applied this test for
many years without apparently having any occasion to examine
its position. With the Brewer-Holt-Utah decisions, and especially
because Holt State Bank involved a Minnesota lake, the court in
1932 changed its title test to conform to the federal rule.' It did
not, however, explicitly point out the error of its prior cases until
1958 in the case of State v. Adams. 74
State v. Adams left Minnesota in a rather awkward position. In
earlier cases the court had announced a strong policy in favor of
the public right of use of the state's lakes and streams. This policy
163. Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
164. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561, 95 Pac. 499 (1908).
165. Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960).
166. Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954).
167. State v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945).
168. Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936).
169. Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
170. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
171. Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
172. "[S]o long as these lakes are capable of use for boating, even for pleasure,
they are navigable within the reason and spirit of the common-law rule." Lamprey v.
Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139, 1144 (1893).
173. County of Becker v. Shevlin Land Co., 186 Minn. 401, 243 N.W. 433 (1932).
174. 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661 (1957).
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now appeared to be thwarted because if the right of public use
followed title, and the beds of a considerable part of the state's
waters were now, under the federal test, in private ownership, the
public would have to be denied the use of these waters. Two years
later the dilemma was resolved in favor of the public policy. In
Johnson v. Seifert"5 the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed itself
and held that the right of public use was no longer based on public
title but rather was founded on the common law of riparian rights:
It is not to be overlooked that the Federal test of navigability is de-
signed for the narrow purpose of determining the ownership of lake
beds, and for the additional purpose of identifying waters over which
the Federal government is the paramount authority in the regulation
of navigation. Whether waters are navigable has no material bearing
on riparian rights since such rights do not arise from the ownership
of the lakebed but as an incident of the ownership of the shore.17
Because of the policy favoring public use of lakes and streams, the
rights of riparians on these lakes and streams were subject to an
easement in favor of the public for recreational and other purposes.
To a lesser extent the Oregon court also had to reexamine its
position following the Brewer-Holt-Utah series. In the early case
of Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club,'1 77 the court had originated a
four-part test of navigability which no other court has ever
followed:
[S]treams and bodies of water are divided into several distinct
classes: (1) Those in which the tide ebbs and flows, which are
technically denominated navigable, in which class the sovereign is
the owner of the soil constituting the bed of the stream, and all right
to it belongs exclusively to the public. (2) Those which are navigable
in fact for boats, vessels or lighters. In these the public has an ease-
ment for purposes of navigation and commerce, they being deemed
public highways for such purpose, although the title to the soil con-
stituting their bed remains in the adjacent owner, subject to the
superior right of the public to use the water for purposes of trans-
portation and trade. (3) The streams which are so small and shallow
that they are not navigable for any purpose, the public has no right to
whatever. (4) To this list may be added our larger rivers susceptible
of a great volume of commerce where the title to the bed of the stream
remains in the state for the benefit of the public. 1 78
175. 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960).
176. 100 N.W.2d at 694.
177. 90 Ore. 13, 175 Pac. 437 (1918).
178. 175 Pac. at 439. (Emphasis added.)
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Part two of the test appears to be a fair statement of the federal
test for title; yet the Oregon court indicated that the beds of the
waters in this category were privately owned. Later in the 1936
case of Luscher v. Reynolds179 the court had to, and did, recognize
the controlling effect of the federal test and changed part (2) to
mean that the beds of waters in this category were state owned.
(Interestingly the court did not indicate in the opinion that it was
making the change.) The court then went on to define the waters
that were subject to the public right of use and adopted what is
essentially the "pleasure boat" test for this purpose.'80
The cases in the other seven jurisdictions which recognize a
public right of use were cases of first impression where the courts
were not required to reverse or redefine prior holdings. Two other
jurisdictions deserve special attention: Iowa and South Dakota. If
all of the Western States are to be listed which, on one theory or
another, allow public use of small lakes and streams (nonnavigable
by the federal test), these two states must be included. As indicated
earlier, South Dakota still adheres to the erroneous "pleasure
boat" test for determining title to beds, holding that the state owns
the beds of virtually all streams and lakes in the state.'8 ' It further
holds that the public has the right of use on all streams and lakes
where the beds are state owned, which again is all usable water of
the state. Conceivably the court may one day correct its rule con-
cerning title to conform to the federal test. If it does so, it will
undoubtedly have to reexamine its rule about public use.
Iowa similarly must be included among the states that permit
the public to use its small lakes and streams. Its approach, however,
is to declare that the title to the beds of these nonnavigable waters
never passed out of federal ownership, and that as long as the beds
are federally owned the public has a right to use the water, at least
until the federal government complains. Thus, the public in this
state, too, is assured of a right to use virtually all lakes and streams.
179. 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936).
180. While we have held that Blue Lake is not a navigable body of water in
the sense that title to the bed thereof would pass to the state upon admission to
the Union, it is navigable in a qualified or limited sense . . . . There are hun-
dreds of similar beautiful, small inland lakes in this state well adapted for
recreational purposes, but which will never be used as highways of commerce
in the ordinary acceptance of such terms . . . . Regardless of the ownership
of the bed, the public has the paramount right to the use of the waters of the
lake for the purpose of transportation and commerce.
56 P.2d at 1162.
181. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
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C. Bases for Common or Public Right of Use
There are three theoretical bases for decisions giving the public
a right of use on waters over privately owned beds.
8 2
The most widely used theory is simply the common law as ap-
plied to the law of riparian rights. It is to repeat the obvious to
state that riparian rights vary from time to time and from place to
place, depending on social, economic, and political needs of society
as viewed by its judiciary. The courts in this first group of states
believe that society's needs require the recognition of a public right
of use, essentially for recreation, although some of the early cases
also took in log floating, even where the beds of the waters were
privately owned. These courts define riparian rights so as to deny
riparians the right to exclude others from the use of the water.
One of the courts in this group neatly parried an argument to the
contrary by inquiring: "What practical value would the vested
rights to boat, swim, fish and bathe, have to any riparian owner if
such rights were restricted to his fenced-in pie-shaped portion of
the lake" ?18 3
California, 184 Idaho,""' Minnesota,'86 Oregon,'8 7 Texas,'18  and
Washington 8 9 fall into this first category. The statements of the
courts in Washington' 9" and Minnesota are articulate expressions
of this policy. The Minnesota court has said:
Illogical as the rule may be, it must be conceded that a few states
have taken the position that ownership of the bed of a nonnavigable or
private lake carries with it complete and exclusive control and owner-
ship of the overlying waters, but for the most part these states have
few lakes or rivers of any value either to the public or to the riparian
owners. Significantly, however, states which like Minnesota have ex-
tensive waters of recreational or commercial value hold that an abut-
ting or riparian owner has a right of reasonable use of the entire
overlying water, and no distinction is made between navigable and
182. The term "public" is here used generically to denominate all users other than
the riparian owner of the immediately underlying bed. So used, the term encompasses,
in varying degrees, non-owners, adjacent riparians, and their licensees.
183. Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1956).
184. Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
185. Johnson v. Johnson, 14- Idaho 561, 95 Pac. 499 (1908).
186. Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960).
187. Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936).
188. Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
189. Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
190. 296 P.2d at 1019.
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nonnavigable, meandered or unmeandered, or public or private
lakes.' 9'
In both of these states the courts have adopted a slightly more re-
stricted rule concerning public right of use than in the other four
jurisdictions. In each the courts limit the right of use to the ripar-
ians on the same body of water and their licensees, rather than
holding that it is available to any member of the public.
In the Washington case the precise issue was whether licensees
(in fact, business invitees of a resort) could use a small lake in
common with other riparian owners. 19 2 The court held that they
could, subject to the limitation that this use must not unreasonably
interfere with the exercise of similar rights by the others; the court
imposed injunctive restraints on the defendant resort operator. In
the principal Minnesota case the question arose between two
riparians, and the court was not called upon to comment on possible
rights of licensees of riparians or the public in general.193 In a later
Minnesota case, however, the court indicated that the right of use
was available to licensees of riparians as well.9 4
An early Idaho case predicated a public easement for streams
on the need for floating logs downstream to markets and mills.. 5
Nothing was said, either then or in any later Idaho case, about
extending such a right to lakes, nor of taking in recreational ac-
tivities. An early Washington case similarly used log floating as
a basis of public easement on nonnavigable streams, although
stressing the fact that the activity was expressly authorized by
statute. 196
It should be recognized that more frequently than not there are
no clear boundary lines on a submerged lake bed, and as a rule the
location of the boundaries is of no concern to the riparian owners.
At least one court, however, has faced the novel argument that
a common right of surface use should apply only when the bed
191. Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689, 695 (1960).
192. Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
193. Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960).
194. It is clear from Johnson v. Seifert supra that any privileges enjoyed in-
cident to riparian rights are almost universally held to be in common with other
abutting owners and that includes the public where the public is involved
through a town or village as a riparian owner representing the public.
Flynn v. Beisel, 257 Minn. 531, 102 N.W.2d 284, 291 (1960).
195. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561, 95 Pac. 499 (1908).
196. Watkins v. Dorris, 24 Wash. 636, 64 Pac. 840 (1901). See Johnson, Riparian
and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 Wash. L. Rev. 580, 613-14 (1960).
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is unsurveyed. 97 The court held that the precise ownership of the
bed had no bearing on the right of use of the surface.
The other two theories that serve as a basis for public or non-
owner right of use where the title to the bed is privately owned are
both historically oriented. Although they are similar they will be
treated individually here.
In a 1954 Missouri decision the court said that the public right
of use of nonnavigable waters was based on pre-statehood statutes
providing for the government of the Missouri Territory, on the
enabling act by which authority was granted for the Territory to
become a state, and on the state constitution.08 All of these have
similar provisions. For example, the act of Congress providing for
government of the Missouri Territory is typical and it provides:
The Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, and the navigable waters
flowing into them, and the carrying places between the same, shall
be common highways and forever free to the people of the said ter-
ritory and to the citizens of the United States, without any tax, duty,
or impost therefor.' 99
Based on these laws the court held that,
Any title which appellant may have acquired to the bed of the river
* . . was necessarily subject to the applicable law in force at the time,
and such applicable law may not be disregarded in determining
whether the Meramec River . . . is in fact a public highway and
open for public travel by boat and wading. 200
Following this line of thought, the court held that the public right
of use extended not only to the surface, but also extended to the use
of the bed for wading, and the shores for necessary portages. This
reasoning might logically be extended to any lake inter-connecting
with the Mississippi or Missouri systems, but any wider application
could be questioned.
While Missouri appears to be the only jurisdiction to have used
this theory for its decisions on public right of use, several other
states have taken a similar historically oriented approach. These
are classed in the third category presented below.
New Mexico 20' and Wyoming 202 take the position that the
197. Judd v. Bernard, 49 Wash. 2d 619, 304 P.2d 1046 (1956).
198. Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954).
199. 2 Stat. 743 (1912).
200. Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17, 24 (1954).
201. State v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945).
202. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
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declaration in their constitutions that all waters are the property
of the state requires the court to hold that the public has a right
to use these waters for recreation, as well as for commercial navi-
gation. (Colorado specifically rejected this same argument, holding
that the constitutional provision applied only to consumptive water
uses.) 203 The language of the court in the Wyoming case of Day v.
Armstrong is illustrative:
The title to waters . . . being in the State, in concomitance, it
follows that there must be an easement in behalf of the State for
a right of way through their natural channels for such waters upon
and over lands submerged by them or across the bed and channels of
streams or other collections of waters . . . . The waters not being
in trespass on or over the lands where they naturally appear, they
are available for such uses by the public of which they are capable. 20 4
These uses include pleasure boating and permit the incidental
touching or scraping of the bottom, or even wading on the bottom
to free a snagged boat, and apply whether or not the bed is pri-
vately owned. They do not include wading generally, such as for
fishing or portages, and thus these courts refuse to go as far as did
the Missouri court in Elder v. Delcour.205
D. Denial of Public Use Where Beds Are Privately Owned
Of the Western jurisdictions that have spoken on the question
of the public right of use of waters where the beds are privately
owned, Arkansas, Colorado, Montana, and Utah have not been
considered. Texas must also be mentioned again. In these states
the most recent cases tend to favor denying a public right of use.
The weight of the group is weakened, however, by the facts that
(1) two of them, Arkansas 0 6 and Colorado,0 7 were decided prior
to 1910, and (2) the Texas decision denying a public right of use
applies only in a very limited situation, that is, to lakes where the
beds have been explicitly granted to the riparians by the state, and
is not applicable where the riparians received title to the beds by
implication along with the grant of uplands.208
The other two jurisdictions, Montana and Utah, are placed in
203. Hartnqan v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 Pac. 685 (1905).
204. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145 (Wyo. 1961).
205. 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954).
206. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890).
207. Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 Pac. 685 (1905).
208. Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
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this group on the basis of decisions in 1925 and 1946 respectively.
The Montana case is a firm holding against a public right of use.209
The Utah case of Monroe v. State210 was concerned only with title
to the bed of a nonnavigable lake and can be included in this group
only on the basis of weak dicta. No issue of a public right of use
was involved; the only mention of it was by way of an extensive
quotation from Harrison v. Fite, 2 1 the 1906 federal case arising
in Arkansas.
E. The Common Right of Use
The nature and extent of the common right of use in those
states which recognize it will be examined by dividing the topic
into two sections in which the rights and limitations of the lake
users will be considered, be they riparians, licensees, or members
of the general public.
1. What Can the Users Do in Exercise of the Common Right?
Only a few cases have specifically discussed the precise nature
of the rights of the users who share with the riparian owner the
common right of surface use. These cases can be conveniently
classified according to the theoretical bases on which they rest.
As indicated earlier, California, Idaho, Minnesota, Oregon,
Texas, and Washington base their common use concept on the
common law of riparian rights. The Minnesota court has defined
what these users can do:
[A]n abutting or riparian owner of a lake, suitable for fishing, boat-
ing, hunting, swimming, and other domestic or recreational uses,
to which our lakes are ordinarily put in common with other abutting
owners, has a right to make such use of the lake over its entire
surface .... 212
The California court spelled out these rights somewhat more
specifically in quoting with approval from another case, noting that
the right of use for navigation included "incidental use of the
bottom," such as walking on the bottom while bathing, casting an
anchor from a boat in fishing, propelling a duck boat by poling
against the bottom, and walking on the ice if the river is frozen.2 13
209. Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 241 Pac. 328 (1925).
210. 111 Utah 1, 175 P.2d 759 (1946).
211. 148 Fed. 781 (8th Cir. 1906).
212. Johnson v. Siefert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689, 691 (1960).
213. Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
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Statements by the courts in Oregon, Texas, and Washington,
while not so detailed as those above, are consistent with them.
There appears to be no reason to believe these courts would define
the rights differently.
Missouri bases its common use concept on certain federal statutes
and the state constitutional provision noted previously. 14 The
Missouri court held that fishermen and others cannot only boat
and wade in the waters flowing over private land, but can also
portage along the shore around log jams and other obstacles. 215
The right of portage has not been recognized in any other state
and has been expressly denied in at least one.21 6
New Mexico and Wyoming base their common use concepts on
constitutional declarations that all waters belong to the state, that
the state has an easement over private land for the flow of these
waters, and that therefore the Wyoming court has said that these
waters may be used to float craft, and
as a necessary incident to that use, the bed or channel of the waters
may be unavoidably scraped or touched by the grounding of the
craft. Even a right to disembark and pull, push or carry over shoals,
riffles and rapids accompanies this right of flotation as a necessary
incident to the full enjoyment of the public's easement. . . . On
the other hand, where the use of the bed or channel is more than
incidental to the right of floating use of the waters, and the primary
use is of the bed or channel rather than the floating use of the waters,
such wading or walking is a trespass . . . . Such trespass cannot
be made lawful either by legislative or judicial action.2 17
The Wyoming court expressly refused to go as far as the Missouri
court, saying: "We are not inclined to go as far as the Missouri
court when it permitted wading or walking upon the bed or channel
of the river or use of its banks for recreation. '218 Thus, in Wyo-
ming the public cannot wade in a stream for fishing. They are
privileged to touch bottom only incidentally in connection with their
right of floating on the surface.
The New Mexico court has only made general statements about
the right of "fishing" and "navigation" of the public in waters
214. Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954).
215. 269 S.W.2d at 23.
216. Monroe Mill Co. v. Menzel, 35 Wash. 487, 77 Pac. 813 (1904).
217. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145-46 (Wyo. 1961).
218. 362 P.2d at 146.
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flowing over private land. 219 No analysis of the extent of these
rights has been found.
In all three groups of states above, the non-owners have the right
to fish, swim, and boat in waters where the beds and shores are
privately owned, assuming they can reach the water without tres.
passing. Beyond this generalization there appear to be three posi-
tions: (1) those states which allow only navigation and incidental
touching of the bottoms in connection therewith, (2) those states
which also permit wading when done in connection with fishing and
swimming, and (3) the single state which also permits portaging
on the shore around obstacles.
2. Limitations on the Common Right of Use
First, it should be pointed out that with the ever increasing pres.
sure of fishermen and recreationists on the small lakes in the
Western States, it is apparent that for their own protection and
.the protection of the riparians, some restraints must be placed on
the common right of use of these waters. Two general approaches
to this problem offer practical solutions: (1) governmental re-
straints through zoning, traffic laws, and similar regulations; and
(2) common law restraints judicially imposed through the law of
trespass, riparian rights, and nuisance. A third possibility, volun-
tary agreements between the users of the lakes, seems impracticable
in view of the large and constantly changing number of people who
use the lakes.
The writings of Professor Waite, analyzing the theoretical bases
for governmental restraints on lake use, were presented earlier.220
Some of these restraints are now being applied, especially to those
lakes that lie within or very near to metropolitan areas. Speed
zones, restrictions on waterskiing, and other limitations can now
be found on a number of these lakes. However, few lakes lie inside
or near enough to municipalities that they have received such regu-
lation. Historically neither county nor state governments have
accepted responsibility for regulating their use. Whether and how
fast they might do so in the future remains to be seen. In the mean-
time the common law provides the principal alternative.
a. Limitations as to Persons
The right of common use is limited as to persons. In those
jurisdictions, such as Washington and Minnesota, which say that
219. State v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945).
220. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
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the common right of use extends only to riparians and their
licensees, any person who gains access by trespass presumably could
be enjoined because by definition they would not be riparians or
licensees. However, in those states where the public in general
shares this common right of use the answers are not so easy. It
is clear that a member of the public is not entitled to trespass to
gain access to a body of watery.2 1 Nor is it any excuse that there
is no other means of access to the water. However, no case is
known where a riparian other than the owner of the land to which
the trespass occurs has tried to enjoin the use of a lake on the
grounds that access was gained by trespass. A pragmatic analysis
of the Washington-Minnesota rule that limits lake use to riparians
and their licensees suggests that this rule may not be so different
from the "public right of use" rule. For the most part, the public
who gain access to any lake will be licensee of some riparian.
There are, of course, some persons who might gain access to a lake
who would not necessarily be licensees; these would include (1)
those who trespass over riparian land to gain access; (2) those
who fly into the lake;22 2 and (3) those who gain access via riparian
land on a connecting river or stream. Obviously groups (1) and
(3) will be larger or smaller depending on how strictly one defines
the terms "riparian" and "licensee."
In Washington and Minnesota it is nonetheless important to
know who are licensees and who are riparians. It is the physical
relationship of the land to the water that gives rise to the riparian
right, and it would seem that only those who hold possession or the
right to possession of land should be able to exercise riparian rights.
Under this reasoning riparian rights would accrue to lessees, life
tenants, and adverse possessors, but possibly not to easement hold-
ers who have no possessory rights in the land. Thus, if the state
held a public access road by easement, the public might be denied
its use because the state would not be a riparian. Obviously the
nature of the property interest held by the state would be vital,
221. E.g., Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (Dist. Ct. App.
1951) ; Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254,90 Pac. 532 (1907).
222. See State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9,
11 (1940), where after holding that there was no private ownership in the water, the
court said:
Where . . . there are several riparian owners of an inland lake, each owner,
their licensees, and every other inhabitant who can gain access thereto with-
out trespass, may use the surface of the whole lake for boating and fishing
so far and so long as they do not interfere with the reasonable use by others
similarly entitled to that right.
[VOL. 7
WESTERN LAKES AND STREAMS
and this question might well turn on the construction of the instru-
ment, either court decree or grant, creating the interest. If the
acknowledged purpose of the interest were to create a right of way
through which the public could gain access to the water, the court
might find the interest to be a fee on a limitation or some similar
possessory interest, rather than an easement; some courts have also
held that riparian rights go with easements where the easement was
intended to convey such rights, or where it really included the
exclusive control over the riparian area in question.223
Pursuing further the question of who is a licensee, in the Wash-
ington case of Snively v. faber both business invitees and social
guests were included.224 Under the standard definition of licensee,
anyone who comes on a lake by permission of a riparian owner
would also be included. Such a broad definition easily includes
members of the public who gain access to the lake through a state
park or public access road. On the other hand, if a member of the
public, acting without the consent of the state, gained access to a
lake from the edge of a public highway which happened to touch
on a lake, he might not hold the status of licensee. Presumably he
would become a licensee only if the state extended permission
through appropriate regulations, installation of signs, or the like.
b. Limitations on Conduct
The common law provides three principal causes of action for
controlling the conduct of persons who use lake or stream surfaces:
trespass, nuisance, and the concept designated simply as "riparian
rights." Needless to say, the three overlap to some extent.
Trespass can be used to prohibit the use of a lake or strqam by
those who have no legal right to its use, that is, who do not share
the common right of surface use. It can also be used to keep within
legal bounds the conduct of those who, although legally entitled to
use the lake or stream surface, exceed their rights. For example, in
Wyoming 225 (although not in other states) trespass is used to pro-
hibit wading in a nonnavigable river or lake for fishing. It could be
used in all states except Missouri to prohibit portaging, which re-
223. See note 24 supra. Cf. In re Judicial Ditch Proceeding No. 15, 140 Minn. 233,
167 N.W. 1042 (1918), where the court held a city was riparian where it had platted
streets down to the meander line, even though it did not own the fee. The court con-
cluded that it made a difference as to the type of easement in question. An easement
owned by a city, county, or state for road purposes, or by a railroad for track bed
purposes, is closely akin to a fee on a special limitation.
224. 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1956).
225. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
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quires walking over or along the banks. And it could be used in any
Western State to prohibit construction of docks, dikes, or other
permanent installations on the beds.
A more difficult question concerns the temporary use of lake or
stream beds. Apparently the placing of an anchor to hold a boat for
a short time is not a trespass, although permanently anchoring a
boat, dock, or buoy is actionable in all states. Just when the placing
of an anchor, foot, or other object on the bed is a trespass depends
upon the intention of the actor; that is, is he acting in aid of naviga-
tion or is he acting with some other intent not within the scope of
the shared right.
Obviously many of these questions will be difficult to decide, and
the answers will depend upon the evidence adduced in each case.
The difficulties, however, will probably be no greater than those
raised by privilege, consent, and the like in the field of trespass,
which the courts are accustomed to handling.
Nuisance and "riparian rights" are two other theories that may
also be used to control the conduct of persons entitled to use the
surface of lakes and streams. To date the few decisions that speak
on this issue have not (with one exception) 226 clearly identified
whether they are talking the language of nuisance or of "riparian
rights." The general statements found are appropriate to both
theories. 2 7
The only case actually applying one of these theories is the
Washington decision of Snively v. Jaber,228 and it was based on
nuisance. Certainly nuisance is an appropriate theory for use here.
Over the years it has shown a remarkable adaptability to chang-
ing circumstances. Nonetheless, for this purpose it would seem to
have some definite limitations. For example, it is quite possible that
the courts would be reluctant to apply it unless the harm complain-
ed of was quite serious, 22 9 possibly more serious than would be the
case in most lake use conflicts. Also, the harm involved in such
conflicts often affects only, or primarily, recreational interests, and
226. Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
227. Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960) ; Bohn v. Albertson,
107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951) ; see also Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d
569, 594 (1958).
228. 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
.229. "Both public and private nuisances require some substantial interference with
the interest involved." Prosser, Torts § 87, at 598 (3d ed. 1964). (Emphasis added.) As
to the meaning of the term "nuisance," Dean Prosser comments that, "Few terms have
afforded so excellent an illustration of the familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon
a catchword as a substitute for any analysis of a problem . . . .' Id. § 87, at 592.
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the nuisance theory has not often been used to protect these inter-
ests. It is suggested that the nuisance theory may not be as sensi-
tive an instrument as might be desired for handling many lake and
stream use problems. A more refined instrument might be found in
the "riparian rights" theory.
The riparian rights theory has not been used to limit the recrea-
tional use of any lakes in the West. It has, of course, been used
many times to restrain the use of waters for irrigation, waste dis-
posal, and the like, where the activity has caused injury to another
riparian. A considerable body of jurisprudence has been built up
around the rights of riparians to enjoin the activities of other
riparians or members of the public where the other's use of the
water was "unreasonable." Thus, although each riparian has a
right to use the water, his right is relative only, and must be rea-
sonable in relation to the rights of others.
This body of riparian rights law, embodying the principle of
reasonable use, could easily be applied to lake and stream surface
cases. Although riparians, licensees, or members of the public
might have a right to use a lake or stream surface, that right would
only be relative to the rights of others sharing the same body of
water. The reasonableness of the use would depend upon the size
of the body of water, the depth, the use of the shores, other uses of
the waters, and the like.
Although few cases have raised the question of legal controls of
lake or stream use to date, many more will undoubtedly arise in the
future as greater pressure is put on the smaller streams and lakes of
the West. The very purpose for which these bodies of water are
thought desirable, recreation and homesite location, may be thwart-
ed unless some rational means for allocating their use is found.
Whether the courts articulate a "nuisance" theory, or one based on
"riparian rights," the standard of "reasonableness" will probably
be controlling. Just what this will mean in a given state will have
to be worked out on a case by case basis. As this case law develops
it may do so along lines somewhat as follows.
On smaller lakes and streams where the number of riparian own-
ers is high in proportion to the size of the body of water, "reason-
ableness" may require that only the riparians and their personal
guests use the surface; no commercial resorts would be allowed and
no public access roads permitted.
On other bodies of water the public might be allowed entry
through resorts, or public access roads, but the number might be sub-
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ject to limitation, depending on size, number of riparians, and the
like.
Where the public is permitted access, either through resorts or
public access roads, such use might be limited or even terminated
where the conduct of the public becomes unreasonable. Conceivably
the riparians might be thought of as having a "right" of use,
whereas the public might be thought of as having only a "privilege,"
available so long as conduct was reasonable. One of the conditions
imposed on the operator of a resort, or a public access road, might
be control over the members of the public entering the lake through
such points of access.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it should be observed that despite the substantial
number of lake and stream cases decided to date, most of which
have been touched on or reviewed here, the field is sufficiently new
that most of its development lies in the future. The demands on the
smaller lakes and streams of the West are increasing with continued
expansion of population and recreation, and the number of conflicts
over the use of these lakes and streams will undoubtedly increase
proportionately. Much thought needs to be given to the questions
posed by these conflicts.
It is suggested that although this Article has attempted to sur-
vey and analyze the key cases of this large field, there are several
important questions on which this writing can only serve as an
entree to further research. For example, more research is needed
on the individual problems of different states concerning the use
of lakes and streams, and particularly on how best to control ex-
cessive or abusive use of these bodies of water. Further research
is also needed on the complex maze of federal-state relations, look-
ing at such questions as "which rule controls when" and in general
on how the two systems might most efficiently work together.
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